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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
‘Nouns That Cut Slices’: The Ontology and Ethics of Stereotypes and Implicit Bias
by
Christiane Merritt
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy
Program in Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2020
Professor Ron Mallon, Chair
Professor John Doris, Co-Chair
Stereotypes and implicit bias have long been objects of psychological study. Recently,
philosophers, too, have attempted to understand stereotypes and implicit bias: what kinds of
mental states or objects are they? Are stereotypes epistemically deﬁcient or ethically suspect?
How do implicit biases aﬀect behavior, and how might these biases be changed?
This dissertation takes up these and related questions, advancing accounts of stereotyping and
implicit bias informed by evidence from psychology.
Chapter 1 sets the stage by conducting a critical survey of the history and development of
today’s most widely used measures of implicit bias. Although the history of the different tests
suggests that they measure different aspects of cognition, and the replication crisis in psychology
has brought the methodology and results of many studies of implicit bias under suspicion, I argue
that there is evidence that implicit bias is a genuine phenomenon with important real-world
effects (like teachers meting out harsher discipline to Black and Hispanic students or employers
judging women’s resumes to be less impressive than similar resumes submitted by men, among
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other examples; Greenwald et al., 2015). I also propose a functional understanding of implicit
bias in contrast to the dominant mechanistic accounts.
Chapter 2 surveys the most prominent theoretical accounts of implicit bias on offer from
philosophers and psychologists. I build on Chapter 1’s conclusions to argue that, despite the
lively and interesting philosophical debate about the metaphysics of implicit bias, the tendency
on the part of philosophers to extrapolate ethical recommendations from one or another of these
accounts is misguided. First, I establish that these accounts are often presented with an eye
toward recommending ameliorative measures based on the author’s metaphysical conclusions.
By “ameliorative measures” I mean interventions designed to reduce the harm caused by implicit
bias. This is prima facie a sensible approach because knowing the structure of implicit biases can
give clues about how to intervene to reduce or eliminate them (or their effects). For example, if
implicit biases are associations, we could reasonably expect that combatting our biases would be
better achieved by strengthening new, less biased associations, whereas if implicit biases are
propositions, exposure to arguments that undercut those biases should prove most effective1.
Ultimately, I argue that in making these recommendations, philosophers have conflated the
activation stage and the expression stage of implicit bias. Separating these is important because,
as I will argue, activation is ethically irrelevant. It is the expression of implicit bias that carries
ethical weight. I consider the case of moral scrupulosity to help make this point. Ultimately,
because the place for ethical concern is the expression stage, we do not need to wait for the
correct metaphysical theory to evaluate interventions. This is a welcome result given the glut of
metaphysical accounts on offer and the difficulty in adjudicating among them.
Chapter 3 broadens the discussion by considering ethical aspects of stereotyping (implicit
or explicit). I give a definition of stereotyping, one that is consistent with a variety of accounts of
viii

stereotyping, for the sake of argument. I argue that there is nothing necessarily wrong with
stereotyping per se, but that defenses of the value of stereotyping have overlooked the epistemic
and social costs of stereotyping, and defenses of the cognitive necessity of stereotyping overlook
possibilities for change through cognitive and environmental plasticity.
Finally, Chapter 4 argues that most current accounts of responsibility for implicit bias take
what I call the life hack approach, which emphasizes individual control over one’s cognitive
landscape and immediate environment. I develop an objection by considering cases of perverse
hacks: hacks that fulfill all the requirements of the life hack approach to eliminating ill effects of
implicit bias, but nevertheless seem deeply unsatisfying, perhaps even morally wrong. I then
consider one response to perverse hacks, namely, abandoning the life hack approach in favor of
structural solutions (advocated by, for example, Haslanger and Anderson). Despite its merits, I
argue that the structural solutions approach also fails to adequately address the problem of moral
responsibility for implicit bias. Finally, I draw on the relational autonomy literature to work
toward a new account of responsibility for implicit bias, one that combines the strengths of both
the life hack and structural approaches while avoiding their pitfalls.
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Chapter 1: Implicit Bias – A Functional Approach
Implicit bias is invoked to explain a wide variety of phenomena, from individuals’ biased
actions in the absence of biased intentions to persistent societal-level discrimination in spite of
people’s increasingly egalitarian conscious attitudes. At the same time, there is very little
agreement among either psychologists or philosophers about what exactly implicit bias is. or
what sorts of processes, structures or mechanisms are responsible for instances of implicit bias.
Likewise, there is very little agreement about what implicit bias could possibly explain, either “in
here” within an individual’s psychology or “out there” in the world of racial, sexual, and
economic inequalities (among many others).
There is much scholarly discussion about the particulars of implicit bias as a cognitive
construct. Are implicit biases propositional in structure (Mandelbaum 2016)? Or are they better
understood in terms of association (Madva 2016a)? Perhaps they are something else altogether,
like “patchy endorsements” (Levy 2015) or “aliefs” (Gendler 2008a, 2008b).This discussion is
worthwhile, and I take it up in the following chapter, which builds upon this chapter to argue that
moral evaluation of implicit biases should focus on the behavioral expressions of bias rather than
its psychological activation. Although the history of the different tests developed to measure
implicit bias suggests that they may measure different aspects of cognition, and the replication
crisis in psychology has brought the methodology and results of many studies of implicit bias
under suspicion, I argue that there is evidence that implicit bias is a genuine phenomenon with
important real-world effects. This is important not only for psychological classification but also
for intervention attempts, about which philosophers are more and more interested in making
recommendations (e.g., Madva 2016b).

1

A comprehensive history of the psychological study of implicit social cognition would
have several possible starting points to choose from. Because we are interested primarily in
modern experimental psychology, this chapter traces the history of implicit social cognition as
studied in Europe and the Americas, particularly in the latter half of the 20th century and the
beginning of the 21st. I will look at influences from both social psychology and cognitive
psychology.
First, I give a definition and general overview of "implicit social cognition" as currently
studied by psychologists. I then look at the origins of some key concepts that inform research in
implicit social cognition. Many of these concepts — attention, unconscious processing, priming,
and automaticity — originate from classic experiments in cognitive psychology, largely from
the mid-20th century. Next, I look at how these concepts were gradually applied to issues in
social psychology, like stereotyping and bias. I also review experimental methods designed to
measure implicit social cognition. These methods include the Implicit Association Test (IAT),
the Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT), and the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP).
Finally, I consider recent skeptical arguments that implicit bias research has fallen prey to the
replication crisis and that “implicit bias” does not have significant explanatory value. In
response, I argue that the behavioral consequences of implicit bias — as measured in laboratory
tests and as observed in the “real world” — indicate that implicit bias is a genuine and significant
phenomenon.

1.1 What is Implicit Social Cognition?
A definition of “implicit social cognition,” even if provisional, will help set the scope of
the project. The phrase was coined by Greenwald and Banaji (1995). Although there has been an
explosion of research in this area since 1995, several psychologists had already made
2

considerable headway toward understanding the phenomenon by that date. Different researchers
may use the term differently, and may refer to anything from introspectively inaccessible
attitudes to information that can be gleaned without requiring participants to introspect (Payne
and Gawronski 2010, 4). As defined by Greenwald and Banaji (1995), though, “implicit social
cognition” has a precise meaning: “The definition of implicit [social] cognition is that traces of
past experience affect some performance, even though the influential earlier experience is not
remembered in the usual sense—that is, it is unavailable to self-report or introspection” (4-5).
As Payne and Gawronski note, it may be tempting to start a survey of the history of implicit
social cognition by going back as far as Plato or as recently as Freud. Payne and Gawronski
mention Plato's work on "consciousness and intentional behavior" (1), although the memory
analogies in the Theaetetus seem a more natural precursor. The wax tablet and aviary examples
at least suggest that a memory might be retained but not consciously accessed or accessible
(Schacter 1987 claims that Plato was mainly concerned with explicit memory, but arguably,
Plato's theory of Forms shows that he recognized that information might be stored but not
consciously accessible). Likewise, Freud's pioneering work provides a framework for
understanding how "the unconscious" might influence behavior even in the absence of our
explicit knowledge of these "unconscious" motivators.
The works of Plato and Freud, among many others, are certainly important in many ways to
how we think about the mind. However, it is difficult to see any direct links between their
writings and contemporary experimental psychology. Plato was not in any obvious sense
concerned with making and testing predictions about human behavior. Freudian psychoanalysis
has a reputation for positing untestable hypotheses and adding epicycles in the face of
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disconfirming data, so likewise, it is often seen as more of a digression than a way station on the
road to a modern and properly scientific psychology.1
At the same time, it is important to stress the factors that led most clearly and directly to the
current science of implicit social cognition. As Schacter (1987) points out, the theories of Plato
and Freud, and the experiments of Ebbinghaus, Tulving, and many others originated from
disparate traditions and were never integrated into a coherent research program (505). Again, the
story is perhaps more complicated than this: Ebbinghaus’ “savings” experiments, in which
Ebbinghaus measured how much time was “saved” in relearning information, predate Freud’s
publications on the unconscious. While modern implicit memory tasks tend not to rely on the
savings method, Ebbinghaus’ basic approach of measuring memory indirectly in a laboratory
setting continues to be influential, and indeed the gold standard of implicit cognition research
(Roediger 1990, 1042).
Therefore, it makes sense to start a brief survey like this with research dating largely from the
mid-20th century onward, when cognitive psychology and social psychology were beginning to
be established as robust areas of study. In the next section, I give a brief overview of studies in
cognitive psychology that were foundational to the birth of implicit cognition as a research area.
In Section III, I then review how advances in cognitive psychology were applied to social
psychology to create the modern study of implicit social cognition, paying careful attention to
the theoretical underpinnings of different research programs.

It is worth noting that Freud abandoned his seduction theory of hysteria after coming to believe
that not all cases of hysteria were caused by repressed childhood memories. For this reason,
among others, the criticism that Freudian psychology is unfalsifiable is not entirely apt; cf.
Fancher and Rutherford (2012, 465-66).
4
1

1.2 Origins in Cognitive Psychology
Several research programs in cognitive psychology generated insights that were crucial to
establishing implicit cognition, and thereby implicit social cognition, as a research program.
LaBerge and Samuels' (1974) feature analysis model provided a framework for
understanding one type of implicit cognition. This model emphasized automaticity. For example,
consider a child learning to read. She is presented with stimuli in the form of printed words and
sentences. As the child gains skill in reading, the locus of her conscious effort shifts. At first, she
focuses on "feature analysis," or the lines and semicircles that form letters, the ways those lines
and semicircles are arranged, etc. Next, she is able to recognize letters, and then she learns which
sounds correspond to which letters. Finally, attention while reading shifts from syntactic features
to the semantic meanings of words and sentences. Posner and Snyder (1975) posit a
complementary theoretical model that distinguishes attention from automaticity. Attentiondriven processes are slow; produce inhibition as well as facilitation; and depend on conscious
expectancies or conscious control. Automatic processes are fast; produce mainly facilitation; and
are independent of conscious expectancies.
Neely's (1977) semantic priming test was designed to test the Posner and Snyder model.
Briefly, the task involved presenting word pairs in combinations of the following conditions:
switch or non-switch; related or unrelated; expected or unexpected. Participants were presented
with one word, told to expect a related or an unrelated word, and then presented with a second
word. When the second word corresponded with subject expectancy, participants were in the
non-switch condition (e.g., participants in the non-switch were told to expect an unrelated word
and then were presented with an unrelated word). Conversely, when the second word violated
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subject expectancy, participants were in the switch condition (e.g., participants in the switch
condition were told to expect an unrelated word and then were presented with a related word).
Importantly for our purposes, the Posner and Snyder model predicts that automatic processes
are independent of expectancies. Neely’s results were in line with predictions based on Posner
and Snyder's model. That is, high facilitation at 50 ms occurred in related conditions, whether
switch or non-switch. This is expected because at 50 ms, relatively slow conscious processes
have not had time to "kick in"; the subject must rely on automatic associations independent of
conscious control. At 2000 ms, conscious processes are present, and so participants show
facilitation in expected conditions, whether switch or non-switch. Balota and Lorch (1986) also
showed a role for mediated priming in which, again, attention is slower to "get going" than
automatic processes are. In Balota and Lorch, participants pronounced target words more quickly
when presented with a mediated pair like [lion, stripes] (where ‘tiger’ is a “mediating concept”
between ‘lion’ and ‘stripes’) than with an unmediated pair like [chair, eagle].
Memory studies have also contributed greatly to research in implicit cognition. A central
issue in the study of memory is the differentiation of memory systems. For example, people who
may not be able to provide explicit recall of a previously presented word may nevertheless be
able to recognize the word if it is again presented to them (e.g., they may be able to pick out
previously seen words from a list including unseen words at a rate higher than chance). Tulving
therefore identified the "Remember/Know Judgment": one can measure people's judgments of
whether they episodically "remember" having seen the word, or whether they did not have a
relevant episodic memory but "knew" that they had seen the word (Tulving 1985). In the DRM
paradigm, for example, people are presented with a list of words like "bed, snooze, rest, blanket,
slumber” (Roediger & McDermott 1995). They are then asked to make Remember/Know
6

judgments about a variety of words, including some words on the test list, but also "sleep."
Although "sleep" was never presented as part of the test list, a significant proportion report
remembering that they saw "sleep" on the original test list. Supporting the conclusion that
automatic activation of related concepts is responsible for this phenomenon is the result that
early-stage Alzheimer's patients are much more likely to report the non-presented word "sleep"
than any of the words on the list. Conversely, young adults with strong explicit memory abilities
show a higher recall of items actually on the list than of “sleep” (cf. Balota et al. 1999).
These results suggest two ideas that are important for the development of implicit cognition
as a research program in its own right. First, explicit memory and implicit memory can
dissociate; this occurs in both young adults and in early-stage Alzheimer's patients. This suggests
an unconscious memory process, if not a separate memory system, that is independent of
conscious, explicit memory (cf. Roediger 1990, pp. 1048-9 for an overview of the debate about
distinct memory systems versus different retrieval processes). Second, the result in Alzheimer's
patients in particular is highly suggestive; it seems implicit memory can operate independently of
explicit memory (which is quite poor in these patients compared to both young adults and normal
older adults). Swinney's cross-modal priming paradigm gives results that support this
interpretation. Depending on when participants were probed, they displayed priming effects for
both interpretations of an ambiguous word (e.g., "bug," either an insect or a surveillance device)
or for a biased/primed interpretation only (Swinney 1979). Again, Neely's results and Posner and
Snyder's model seem relevant here; at a short stimulus onset, only automatic associations are
available, whereas at a long onset, both automatic and conscious associations are available.
Finally, Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971) developed a lexical decision task that has proved
useful in cognitive and social psychology. In the basic task, participants were asked to judge
7

whether a single string of letters was a word or non-word. In an elaboration of the task,
participants were asked to judge whether two strings of letters presented simultaneously were
either both words or both non-words. Judgments for two associated words were faster than for
two non-associated words.
Payne and Gawronski point out that the articles discussed above, which are considered
classics in cognitive psychology, may also be "subsumed under the umbrella term ‘implicit
social cognition’ [and] emphasize the differences between automatic and controlled cognition,
with little mention of the unconscious" (p. 2). The next section will explore research in social
psychology, much of which also focuses on “automatic” processing (though there are some
mentions of “conscious” and “unconscious” processes).

1.3 Origins in Social Psychology
Social psychologists in America have had a longstanding interest in prejudice,
discrimination, and stereotypes. Against the background of slavery, Jim Crow laws, the civil
rights movement, and continued discrimination against African-Americans, social psychologists
— particularly those in the United States — have often theorized about the origin and nature of
stereotypes. For example, Gordon Allport proposed a theory of stereotypes according to which
stereotypes work mainly at the level of the individual and function to explain away irrational
prejudices toward “out-group” members (Allport 1954/1979). Allport saw prejudice as an
inevitable consequence of mental categories; categorization produces generalizations or
stereotypes, which in turn produce prejudice.
If one adopts this theory, as Devine (1989) notes, it is possible to overlook that the individual
may either endorse or reject certain prejudices. As Devine puts it, there is a difference between
knowledge of a stereotype (i.e., that a stereotype about some group exists) and endorsement of
8

that stereotype (p. 5). This distinction has been picked up recently by philosophers like Gendler
(2011), who argues that the need to balance knowledge of stereotypes with egalitarian normative
goals presents an epistemic dilemma.
Tests of automatic associations were quickly taken up by social psychologists, who saw an
opportunity to sidestep the problem of self-report in research on bias. Self-report may be more or
less problematic depending on the context in which it is used. That is, the usefulness or validity
of self-report measures depends on the construct the task is designed to measure. Self-report may
be especially helpful in, e.g., clinical contexts, where a patient's report of feeling unhappy and
unable to take pleasure in life is an important element in the diagnosis of depression. Social
psychologists, especially beginning in the 1970s, were increasingly concerned with measuring
bias and not only or primarily constructing theories about stereotypes, as Allport and others did.
One way to measure whether a person holds racist attitudes is to ask the person to report his or
her attitudes toward another race. However, this seemingly straightforward technique is
problematic because "self-reporting motives meant many participants would not honestly report
their attitudes" (Payne and Gawronski 2010, 2). Participants who do not want to appear racist -that is, almost all participants -- have incentives not to report racist attitudes, even if they endorse
those attitudes.
Innovative studies in cognitive psychology on topics like attention and memory, a sample of
which were surveyed above, provided new tools for social psychologists studying race and racial
attitudes. As Payne and Gawronski note, most of these "early" studies of implicit social cognition
seem to focus on race. Historically, this makes sense; in the early 1970s, the civil rights
movement was fresh in Americans' minds, and the women's liberation movement had not yet
crystallized. As time passed, though, psychologists who studied implicit social cognition became
9

concerned with implicit attitudes about more than race. Gender was a natural next step, given the
women's movement that followed on the heels of the civil rights movement, and studies of
implicit social attitudes have only broadened since. For example, the Implicit Association Test
(IAT) now has versions that can be used to test implicit bias against gay people, against
overweight people, and against many other minority groups who historically have faced
discrimination in the United States (e.g., Harvard’s Project Implicit at implicit.harvard.edu; the
IAT, along with other measures of implicit social cognition, will be discussed in more detail in
the next section).
Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983) use the lexical decision task pioneered by Meyer and
Schvaneveldt (1971; discussed above) to study what are now referred to as implicit racial
attitudes. This task seems to have been chosen for two major reasons. First, it was already highly
replicated and was considered to be a reliable measure. Gaertner and McLaughlin pioneered the
study of implicit social cognition in this article, and using a well-known and reliable task helped
establish the trustworthiness of their own study. Second, the task was able to address a persistent
question asked by social psychologists on which little progress had been made, namely: How can
people's racial attitudes be studied accurately when participants have motivations (both from
societal expectations and experimenter demands) not to reveal their attitudes when asked
directly?
Interestingly, the word "implicit" does not appear at all in Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983).
Neither do the words "unconscious" or "automatic." The authors seem more interested in
addressing the problem of reducing the effects of experimenter demands where these demands
interfere with participants' reports of racially biased attitudes. The authors explain:
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The method used in the present work is based upon the assumption that a stereotype is, in
part, a collection of associations that link the target group to a set of descriptive
characteristics. Stereotyping further implies that these characteristics associated with the
target group are also ascribed to them. Measures of associative strength, therefore, should
serve partially as measures of the content of a stereotype. There are many procedures used to
assess associative strength and many, such as free associative responding, would be just as
reactive as questionnaire procedures. There appears, however, to be a truly nonreactive
measure emerging from the recent cognitive literature. (p. 23)

Insofar as the lexical decision task exposes associations that people have between different
properties (say, between "White" and "industrious"), it is able to bypass the problem of
experimenter demands and deliver more accurate information about the extent to which people
hold stereotyped attitudes.
There is then, obviously, the question of whether people "really endorse" the prejudicial
beliefs that seem to underlie their relatively low reaction times to stereotype-congruent word
associations. Devine (1989) takes up this question with a study that seeks to measure
stereotyping while acknowledging that endorsed beliefs may come apart from stored knowledge.
For example, there is a widespread stereotype that people with higher weights are lazier and have
less self-control than people with average or low weights. This stereotype serves as a kind of
common background knowledge that is learned over time and that helps make sense of certain
behaviors and policies (for example, efforts to restrict the sale of foods and drinks believed to be
fattening, like soda).

11

As mentioned earlier, one may have this knowledge without endorsing it, that is, without
having an explicit belief (whether expressed verbally or kept to oneself) that heavier people are
generally lazier. Devine refers to this kind of disconnect as a "fundamental conflict" experienced
by people who have learned stereotypes since young childhood and have formed strong
associations along the way, but who currently do not believe those stereotypes are true.
According to Devine, "this analysis suggests that whereas stereotypes are automatically
activated, activation of personal beliefs requires conscious attention. In addition, nonprejudiced
responses require both the inhibition of the automatically activated stereotype and the intentional
activation of nonprejudiced beliefs" (6-7; emphasis added. The distinction between inhibition
and activation as contributing factors in implicit social cognition will be discussed further in
Section IV).
But how is it possible to test for knowledge of stereotypes about a group independently of
personal beliefs or emotions? The tasks Devine uses are inspired by the research in cognitive
psychology discussed above. This research is intended to demonstrate dissociation between
quick, automatic, associative, involuntary responses and slow, controlled, voluntary, or
conscious responses. Devine cites the Posner and Snyder model and Neely's word expectancy
tests in particular. Recall Neely's work showing that conscious expectancies are able to override
automatic associations after delays of 2000 ms, but not after just 50 ms.
Devine's study, then, applies methods from cognitive psychology to help answer existing
questions in social psychology. For example, she cites social priming literature: "Duncan (1976)
found that Whites interpreted the same ambiguous shove as hostile or violent when the actor was
Black and as playing around or dramatizing when the actor was White…. Sagar and Schofield
(1980) replicated these findings with schoolchildren" (p. 7). While Duncan's and Sagar and
12

Schofield's results are interesting and important, they are in some respects difficult to interpret
without further information. For example, how much does (conscious or explicit) prejudice level
play a part in these sorts of priming studies? Do participants who score low on measures of
prejudice show significant differences from participants with high prejudice scores?
Devine's study draws on Neely's work to design experiments to help answer these questions.
She concludes that in an ambiguous situation, stereotypes are activated automatically in both
high- and low-prejudice participants. At the same time, low-prejudice participants are able to
inhibit automatic activation of stereotypes while generating lists of labels for and thoughts about
African-Americans (p. 13; p. 15).
Payne and Gawronski claim that Devine (1989) has "little to say about conscious awareness
of attitudes.... [The study] emphasized the idea that well-learned associations should be activated
automatically, but weakly learned associations require cognitive effort to be retrieved" (2) rather
than anything about conscious or unconscious attitudes per se. However, Devine does in fact
mention "conscious" behaviors or attitudes several times in her article; "conscious" appears
about 30 times and "nonconscious" twice. Devine refers to the literature on nonconscious
priming, specifically Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982), as a model for one of the tasks. It is
perhaps more accurate to say that Devine's model does not speak much about nonconscious
attitudes, though her focus on attention rather than consciousness makes sense given the
influence of Posner & Snyder and Neely.
Studies of "conscious," "unconscious," "explicit" and "implicit" attitudes or stereotypes draw
their inspiration from the memory studies cited above, among others. Payne and Gawronski
(2010) identify Greenwald and Banaji (1995) as a turning point away from an
attention/automaticity research program and toward an implicit/explicit or
13

conscious/unsconscious research program: they count the words "conscious" and "awareness"
100 times in Greenwald and Banaji. It is perhaps worth noting again that Devine (1989) does
mention "conscious" and "aware" about four dozen times altogether, although not necessarily as
synonyms.

1.4 Measures of Implicit Social Cognition
This section briefly surveys some of the most important developments in the measurement of
implicit social cognition by scoring implicit bias in individuals. The Implicit Association Test
(IAT) was first described in Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz (1998). The central experiment
in this study (Experiment 3) was designed to test whether the IAT was sensitive to
discriminations between implicit and explicit bias, following the demonstration of such
discriminations in the work of Devine (1989) and others. A majority (19) of 26 White
participants indicated either a general neutrality toward or general preference for Black people
(as measured by questionnaires eliciting responses about explicit attitudes). At the same time, 18
of these 19 participants had a negative IAT score (indicating more negative implicit attitudes
when presented with stereotypically Black names versus stereotypically White names) and only
one subject out of the 26 had a positive IAT score. Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz took these
results as evidence of the validity of the IAT as a construct. (They acknowledge the possibility of
different interpretations, like the possibility that the White students in thus study were just
unfamiliar with Black names, and that the IAT simply measured unfamiliarity rather than
anything interesting or important about implicit attitudes. However, this possibility does not
explain the results of Experiment 1, in which high-frequency insect words were rated as more
negative than lower-frequency flower words; 1477).
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While the IAT is now employed to test a variety of automatic or implicit associations, its
core structure has remained the same since its introduction. The classic IAT includes five test
blocks and requires participants to respond to task demands in each by pressing a right-hand or
left-hand button. The first three blocks introduce participants to the test by requiring them to (1)
sort photographs of faces by race (if ‘White’ is on the right-hand side of the screen, pressing the
right button [R] when a White face appears); (2) sort words as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (if ‘bad’ is on the
left-hand side of the screen, pressing the left button [L] when ‘pain’ appears); and (3) combining
the two previous blocks, sort faces by race and words by valence (if ‘White/good’ is on the right
side of the screen and ‘Black/bad’ on the left, pressing R when ‘beautiful’ appears and L when a
Black face appears). This third block is also referred to as the compatible trial. The fourth block
reverses the presentation of the first block’s categories, i.e., if ‘White’ initially appeared on the
right side of the screen and ‘Black’ on the left, ‘White’ is now on the left and ‘Black’ on the
right. Finally, the fifth block again requires participants to sort faces and words, i.e. pressing R
for a positive word or Black face and L for a negative word or White face. This is the
incompatible trial. Some versions expand the third and fifth blocks into a short practice session
and longer experimental session. Historically, only the longer sessions were compared to each
other to calculate the participant’s score with the shorter sessions considered practice rounds, but
the current standard is to include the shorter sessions in analyses as well (cf. Teige-Mocigemba,
Klauer, and Sherman 2010).
Thus, IAT scores are calculated by comparing a participant’s mean response time in Block 3
with their mean response time in Block 5. This means that the IAT is inherently comparative.
While lay explanations of the IAT often assume the test measures a participant’s anti-Black (or
anti-woman, or weight-related…) biases, the IAT by itself is designed only to reveal the relative
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strengths of a participant’s associations. It does not reveal reliable information about the
source(s) of the associations; about their place in the participant’s cognitive landscape; or about
whether mean response times reflect (for example) strong negative associations with Blackness
or strong positive associations with Whiteness, or a combination of more moderate pro-White
and anti-Black associations. It is potentially misleading, then, to reduce comparisons between
different IAT blocks to a single score. One number cannot tell us whether a participant’s
measured bias is driven more by performance in an incompatible trial or a compatible trial, or by
differences in responses to target or attribute blocks (Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer, & Sherman,
120).
Why should more fine-grained information matter? Perhaps it is enough to have confirmation
that most people tend to automatically associate ‘Black’ with ‘bad’ and ‘White’ with ‘good.’
This basic knowledge might even motivate someone to make changes to reduce their individual
biases or to rearrange their environment to minimize the expression of biases. This seems to be
the reasoning behind, for example, the University of Virginia’s recent policy requiring incoming
undergraduates to take IATs (Denby 2017): diversity on campus will be improved if students
know more about their unconscious biases.
However, it is unclear how knowing one’s IAT score will motivate one to take any particular
action. If I am moderately biased against women according to the IAT, should I take different
steps than if I am slightly biased or very biased? The problem is sharpened when one considers
the IAT’s notoriously low test-retest reliability (Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007).
Likewise, Project Implicit’s website warns: “At this stage in its development, it is preferable to
use the IAT mainly as an educational tool to develop awareness of implicit preferences and
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stereotypes. For example, using the IAT to choose jurors is not ethical. In contrast, it might be
appropriate to use the IAT to teach jurors about the possibility of unintended bias.”
To address some of the criticisms aimed at the IAT, Nosek & Banaji (2001) introduced the
Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT). They noted that this measure was not intended as a
replacement for earlier tests like the IAT, but was proposed with an acknowledgement that a
diverse set of tests may prove helpful, especially since terms like "attitude" are not always welldefined from test to test. The GNAT's contribution to the study of implicit social cognition is to
allow the measure of implicit attitudes toward a single category, without the inclusion of
"complementary or contrasting objects" (p. 625). Whereas the IAT is unable to measure to what
degree negative attitudes toward certain groups are driven by in-group preference versus outgroup dislike (recall Devine’s (1989) distinction between inhibition of associations and
activation of associations), the GNAT is able to test each possibility separately. In addition, the
authors suggested that the GNAT is more ecologically valid insofar as it tests face recognition
instead of the IAT's name recognition (they claimed face recognition was also a more precise
measure, since names may have socioeconomic as well as racial associations). However, the
GNAT may be administered using linguistic categories as stimuli, and a version of the IAT may
test face recognition.
Because the GNAT tests participants’ reaction times in identifying stimuli in singular
categories rather than contrast categories, participants respond by either pressing a button (go) in
response to a target stimulus or not pressing it (no-go) in response to a distractor stimulus, rather
than pressing one of two buttons. For example, in a racial-bias GNAT, a participant would be
instructed to press a button when presented with a stimulus from the target category (Black
faces) or a target attribute (positive). Distractor stimuli might include non-target negative
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attributes, where responding correctly would require not pressing the button. In a second block
(with block order varied among participants), participants give a “go” response to Black faces
and negative attributes and a “no-go” response to positive attributes. Unlike the IAT, the GNAT
is scored by using signal detection theory to calculate error rates by comparing responses to “go”
stimuli between the two blocks.
The Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) was proposed by Payne et al. 2005, who drew
inspiration from the tradition of social psychological investigation concerned with misattribution
effects. For example, physical effects of hiking (increased heart rate, sweating) can be
interpreted, or misattributed, as caused by sexual attraction. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and
Jacoby, Kelley and Dywan (1989) are notable examples of studies of misattribution (cf. Roediger
1990, p. 1053). Payne et al. also noted the continued popularity of projective tests like the
Rorschach ink blot test and Morgan and Murray’s (1935) Thematic Apperception Test (TAT),
while acknowledging persistent doubts about the validity and reliability of these tests. They
argued that projective tests are plausibly interpreted as measures of misattribution; on this theory,
an ambiguous inkblot prompts the subject to project an unconsciously held attitude, emotion, or
thought onto the image itself, misattributing the source of the identified attitude (i.e., "seeing" its
source as in some property of the inkblot rather than in her mind).
Payne et al. attempted to create a valid, reliable projective measure of implicit attitudes by
combining the ambiguity inherent in projective tests with the “precision and control” of
contemporary priming experiments. To this end, Payne et al. created a priming task. (Recall
Swinney’s 1979 priming task examined earlier.) Briefly, participants were presented with a
prime image selected from drawings of "negative" stimuli (e.g., spiders) and "positive" stimuli
(e.g., flowers). After the prime image appeared on-screen for 75 ms, followed by a blank screen
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for 125 ms, a Chinese pictogram appeared on-screen for 100 ms. The participant then reported
whether he or she found the pictogram pleasant or unpleasant. Some participants were warned
that the prime images might bias them and that they should correct for this bias. However, the
results for both warning and no-warning conditions were similar. In both groups, there was a
large priming effect.
Applying this method to racial bias in particular, Payne et al. created a 3x2 design in which
Black and White participants were presented with pictographs preceded by photographs of White
faces, Black faces, or by a neutral prime (following the prime-blank screen-pictograph method
described above). The authors found that White participants displayed a pro-White bias whereas
Black participants displayed a pro-Black bias. That is, White participants tended to evaluate
pictographs more positively after priming with a White face, while Black participants tended to
evaluate pictographs more positively after priming with a Black face (287). Notably, while
Payne et al. predicted this result for White participants, they refrained from making a prediction
for Black participants, because previous attempts to measure implicit attitudes of Black people
toward White people had provided mixed results, with some studies showing a preference for
White people across participant races and some showing a within-race preference.
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) was developed by Barnes-Holmes et
al. (2006; 2010) and is based on REC principles. Unlike most tests of implicit attitudes, which
measure associations between concepts to reveal relative preferences, the IRAP can distinguish
different kinds of relationships between experimental targets and pre-existing attitudes (e.g.,
relationships of similarity or opposition). For example, an IAT experiment might demonstrate
that someone is quicker to respond to “Black-negative” and “White-positive” pairings than to
“Black-positive” and “White-negative,” but the IAT’s design is inherently comparative, so we
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cannot draw any conclusions about whether the participant dislikes2 Black people or likes White
people (since the results could be driven by either attitude, or by some mixture of both, or even
by a combination of liking for Black people and greater liking for White people). Likewise,
someone who responds quickly and accurately to “me-good” pairings might respond this way
because she believes she is good or because she wants to be good, even though she doesn’t
believe she is. Indeed, IATs have found that implicit self-esteem is just as high in depressed
people as in people without depression, while the IRAP is able to demonstrate that depressed
students score highly on trials targeting the belief “I want to be good” and poorly on trials
targeting “I am good” (Remue et al. 2013; 2014).
The IRAP consists of two conditions — inconsistent-relations and consistent-relations — and
participants are randomly assigned to begin on one condition or the other, with conditions
alternating across six trials. Participants take the test on a computer and are instructed that the
feedback they receive may not always make sense, but to continue the test. During each trial, two
relational terms (like “similar” and “opposite”) appear at the bottom left and right of the screen
and a sample stimulus word (like “pleasant” or “unpleasant”) appears at the top of the screen. A
target word appears in the center of the screen — in this case, a word that people would agree is
pleasant (“peace,” “love,” etc.) or unpleasant (“murder,” “sickness,” etc.). In inconsistentrelations trials, incongruent responses are reinforced, i.e., pressing the key for “opposite” when
the sample stimulus is “unpleasant” and the target word is “murder.” In a consistent-relations

“Dislikes” is used here in the sense of having a negative attitude toward something, and “likes”
in the sense of having a positive attitude toward something. This might seem obvious, but the
psychological usages of “likes” and “dislikes” are different from the colloquial usages. Someone
might be described colloquially as “disliking” group X because they favor group Y while,
psychologically speaking, they like both groups but have a preference (greater liking) for group
Y.
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trial with the same sample stimulus and target, participants would be reinforced to press the key
for “similar.”
Although it is capable of discriminating attitudes in a more fine-grained way than tests like
the IAT, the IRAP is much more taxing for participants than the IAT. For example, whereas
there are no “wrong” answers on an IAT, the IRAP requires the participant to produce the correct
answer before proceeding to the next screen (Barnes-Holmes et al. 2006, 9). In some studies,
upwards of 20% of participants fail to complete the IRAP (De Houwer et al. 2015, 2).
Accordingly, the relational response task (RRT) was introduced by De Houwer et al. (2015)
to preserve the discriminatory power of the IRAP approach while reducing its difficulty.
In the RRT, participants are told to answer as if they agree or disagree with statements that
appear in the center of a computer screen, like “I am good,” “I don’t like myself,” “Flemish
people are smarter than immigrants,” or “Flemish people are less clever than immigrants.” The
procedure is similar to that of the IAT: participants complete five blocks of tasks, including
practice blocks; a block in which they are told to respond as if they agree that Flemish people are
smarter than immigrants; and a “switch” block in which they are told to respond as if they agree
that immigrants are smarter than Flemish people.
As in the IRAP, participants are told to agree as if they have certain beliefs, and the contents
of the beliefs vary across blocks (so, in the Flemish example, participants would respond to both
“I believe the Flemish are cleverer than immigrants” and “I believe immigrants are cleverer than
the Flemish”). At the same time, participants have fewer stimuli to keep track of than they do in
the IRAP. Instead of judging whether a sample stimulus and a target are similar or opposite,
participants see a statement and select either “agree” or “disagree.”
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DeHouwer et al. go on to argue that the IRAP, IAT and RRT — indeed, all measures of
implicit bias — ultimately measure the same construct: implicit propositional belief. The
advantage of the RRT over the others, according to them, is not that it measures a different kind
of construct, but that it more accurately measures implicit belief. However, there is no agreement
in the literature that REC implies or requires that implicit attitudes be propositional. For
example, Barnes-Holmes et al.’s (2010) survey of relational theory argues that REC presents an
alternative to dual-process propositional/associative models.
Ultimately, measures like the IAT, GNAT, AMP, IRAP and RRT are "used to underscore the
theoretical point that 'implicit' refers to awareness of how a bias influences a response, rather
than to the experience of bias or the response itself" (Amodio and Mendoza 2010). As
Greenwald and Banaji (1996) note, while indirect measures may be extremely useful in other
areas of psychology (e.g., to reduce demand characteristics), indirect measures are the sine qua
non of implicit cognition and therefore of implicit social cognition. Some studies of intergroup
bias attempt to correlate explicit or self-reported bias with implicit bias, and so may use methods
like self-questionnaires. However, the point is that insofar as implicit bias itself is targeted,
indirect measures must be used.

1.5 Measures of Implicit Social Cognition
We have seen that tests developed to measure implicit biases are based on techniques
designed to tap into attitudes that psychologists have considered resistant to explicit measures.
But these tests have used different techniques for “revealing” hidden attitudes, techniques that
have been developed from different traditions in psychology for different purposes. As we have
also seen, there is a great deal of disagreement about the right way to characterize implicit bias in
terms of mental states. This disagreement can be understood as a mechanistic or psychological
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one: the debate concerns which mental states are the right ones to posit for us to best understand
the workings of implicit bias.
Here, I sketch an alternative to the dominant, mechanistic method of researching implicit
bias. Traditionally, as we have seen, implicit bias is understood in terms of associations, whether
those associations are between a category concept and an attribute concept or a category concept
and an affective state. This was a natural development, given Neely’s experiments based on
Posner & Snyder’s model, where automatic responses at short time intervals are driven by
associations. As we have begun to see from the discussion of relational measures like the IRAP
and RRT, though, there is a robust debate about whether implicit biases are actually
propositional in structure, or whether we should posit some third state that is neither
associational nor propositional. (Chapter 2 looks more closely at this debate with respect to
strategies to change implicit bias, because the effectiveness of various strategies is often taken to
depend on targeting implicit biases in the right way, e.g., by argument if implicit biases are
propositional.)
However, we can also think of implicit bias in relational or functional terms: what are the
inputs and outputs of implicit bias? I suggest that we can think of implicit bias as a functional
relationship between inputs (stereotypes) and outputs (biased behavior). I will discuss
stereotypes in more detail in Chapter 3. Biased behavior can include both responses to
experimental measures and “real-world” behavior.
Recently, De Houwer (2019) has called for understanding implicit bias in terms of behavior.
He points out that while people are often resistant to the idea that they harbor “secret” biases of
which they are unaware, the notion that they simply participate in or express biased behavior
may be an easier pill to swallow. My approach is somewhat different in that I do not define
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implicit bias as just behavior, but rather as a functional relationship between stereotypes and
behavior. Because the behavior we study in the name of implicit bias typically seems to depend
on knowledge or deployment of social stereotypes, it is important to include stereotypes in a
definition of implicit bias.
The main advantage of the functional approach over the traditional mechanistic approach is
that we need not assume that differences in measurements reflect some difference in one
underlying mental construct (cf. De Houwer, 2). Rather, as the history of various implicit bias
measures suggests, different methods may tap into different cognitive processes. Thus, the goal
of the functional approach is not necessarily to replace mechanistic inquiry, but to avoid certain
assumptions that have tended to dominate the mechanistic approach, particularly the oneconstruct assumption.
In the following chapter, I build on the functional approach while evaluating various
philosophical models of implicit bias. While most models find a tight connection between the
metaphysics and the ethics of implicit bias, I argue for the ethical relevance of the expression of
implicit bias in behavior.
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Chapter 2: Implicit Bias – From Metaphysics to Ethics?
Chapter 1 proposed, after surveying different psychological accounts, a functional
approach to implicit bias. This chapter argues that, despite the lively and interesting
philosophical debate about the metaphysics of implicit bias, the tendency on the part of
philosophers to extrapolate ethical recommendations from one or another of these accounts is
misguided.
First, I establish that these accounts are often presented with an eye toward
recommending ameliorative measures based on the author’s metaphysical conclusions. By
“ameliorative measures” I mean interventions designed to reduce the harm caused by implicit
bias. This is prima facie a sensible approach because knowing the structure of implicit biases can
give clues about how to intervene to reduce or eliminate them (or their effects). For example, if
implicit biases are associations, we could reasonably expect that combatting our biases would be
better achieved by strengthening new, less biased associations, whereas if implicit biases are
propositions, exposure to arguments that undercut those biases should prove most effective.3 In
fact, philosophers by and large do derive ethical recommendations from their metaphysical
conclusions, as I show below.
Ultimately, I argue that in making these recommendations, philosophers have conflated
the activation stage and the expression stage of implicit bias. Separating these is important
because, as I will argue, activation is ethically irrelevant. It is the expression of implicit bias that
carries ethical weight. But studying expression will tell us little about metaphysical theories.
Ultimately, philosophers ought to keep in mind the distinction between activation and
expression. More broadly, because the place for ethical concern is the activation stage, we do not
3

This is a rough summary; I review the arguments in more detail below.
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need to wait for the correct metaphysical theory to evaluate interventions. This is a welcome
result given the glut of metaphysical accounts on offer and the difficulty in adjudicating among
them. In addition, focusing on behavioral outcomes accommodates cases of implicit bias in
which there is expression of bias without “biased thought,” as in the case of the scrupulous
person.

2.1 Implicit Biases as Associations
The associationist account of implicit bias could be considered the “received view.”
Indeed, associationism is often assumed rather than argued for in the literature. For example, in
their introduction to the two-volume edited collection Implicit Bias and Philosophy — the first
anthology dedicated to philosophical issues surrounding implicit bias — Brownstein & Saul
(2016) define ‘implicit bias’ as follows:
“Implicit bias” is a term of art referring to evaluations of social groups that are largely
outside of conscious awareness or control. These evaluations are typically thought to
involve associations between social groups and concepts or roles such as “violent,”
“lazy,” “nurturing,” “assertive,” “scientist,” and so on. Such associations result at least in
part from common stereotypes found in contemporary liberal societies about members of
these groups. (1-2)
Similarly, when arguing from the heterogeneity of implicit bias, Holroyd and Sweetman (2016)
urge that “when writing about implicit bias…it would often be helpful…if the particular kinds of
association [i.e., semantic or affective] at issue are articulated” (100).
In general, the associative model coheres nicely with the distinction, widespread in
cognitive and social psychology, between System I and System II processes. Roughly, “System
II” designates cognitive processes that are conscious, slow, and deliberative. “System I” is
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defined in negative: it designates processes that are different from System II. The exact nature of
System I is a matter of dispute, but its processes could be characterized in any of the following
ways: automatic; fast; associative; not under conscious control. (In fact, dual-process theories
that posit a “System I” and “System II” are not without critics, but such theories still enjoy wide
acceptance. My purpose at the moment is to describe such theories, not to argue for or against
them.)
Hughes et al. (2011) develop the case that the associative assumption in theorizing about
implicit bias has a long history and has rarely been subjected to much scrutiny, let alone
challenged. Indeed, most competing theoretical accounts of implicit bias propose (or presuppose)
some associative process or structure, despite major theoretical differences.
For example, the Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model (Gawronski &
Bodenhausen 2006) proposes two types of mental processes that can interact with each other,
although they are conceptually distinct. One type of process (association) is automatic,
associative, and affect-laden, while the other type (propositional thought) is slow, deliberative,
and affectively “cool,” operating according to rules of syllogistic reasoning. Associative
processes produce implicit attitudes and propositional processes produce explicit attitudes.
However, tokens of each type can interact with tokens of the other type, as when “when the
affective reaction elicited by the activated association is consistent with the evaluative judgment
implied by momentarily available propositions, then those reactions will be considered valid and
provide the basis of explicit evaluation” (Hughes et al. 2011, 476). This is an example of a dualprocess model of attitudes.
On the other hand, the Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE) model
(Fazio 1990, 2007) proposes that a single, associative process — linking objects and evaluative
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knowledge of those objects — is responsible for both implicit and explicit attitudes. What
determines whether an attitude is explicit or implicit is the level of deliberative control an agent
has and the opportunity they have to exercise control. For example, the MODE model predicts
that in high-stress situations, people with low motivation to exercise control will act on
associations, even if they would not reflectively endorse those associations. Indeed, this is the
pattern of response we see in police shooting scenarios, including the shooter task (e.g., Glaser &
Knowles 2008). Unlike the dual-process APE model, then, the MODE model proposes a single
process whose outcome depends on two conditions (automatic or deliberative).
As Hughes et al. point out, one could intend to make at least three different claims by
asserting that implicit biases are associative. First, one could mean that in investigating implicit
biases, researchers assume that there is underlying process whereby activated associations will
produce the effects seen from implicit bias measures. This is the assumption shared by the APE
and MODE models, as we have seen. Second, however, one could mean that researchers find
that participants’ behavioral outcomes are the result of the participants associating test stimuli.
Third, one could mean that researchers design the implicit measures so that stimuli are presented
in close spatio-temporal contiguity (477).
Challenges to associationism come from three major directions. First, some argue (De
Houwer et al. 2015, Mandelbaum 2016) that implicit biases are propositional in structure. I
examine this alternative just below, in Section B, and conclude that this approach has brought us
no closer to “solving” the problem of implicit bias. Meanwhile, some argue that implicit biases
are sui generis states (Section C), and others that implicit biases are not attitudes at all (Section
D).

28

2.2 Implicit Biases as Propositions
A minority, but influential, group of psychologists has recently argued that implicit
attitudes are in fact propositional in structure. This is a provocative claim indeed; most social
psychologists and philosophers seem to work from an associative definition or model, as
discussed above. Even those who challenge the associative assumption are not necessarily
committed to the view that all cognition, including implicit attitudes, is propositional (for one
such alternative, see the discussion of Machery, 2017 in Section D below).
There are two key differences between associative models and propositional models.
First, associative links must be created and strengthened over multiple exposures to stimuli,
while propositional knowledge can be acquired through one-shot learning. Second, while
associations merely link two concepts, encoding no information about how the concepts are
related, propositions specify relationships. Indeed, the inability of associations to encode
relationships has been cited as one reason why implicit biases are so difficult to change. Even if I
repeat to myself “old people are not bad drivers” to try to intervene on my implicit bias, I am
only strengthening an associative link between “old people” and “bad drivers” (the better
strategy would be to create and strengthen an association between “old people” and “good
drivers,” according to researchers like Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
At first glance, it seems odd to propose that implicit bias could be propositional, given
the results we see from measures like the IAT, GNAT, AMP and others. Participants are placed
in contexts that require them to respond quickly, so that there is no time for effortful, conscious
thought, which seems to be required for propositional reasoning. Instead, it seems, participants
default to mere associations that they may or may not endorse when they are given more time to
reflect on their responses. The person who is shown their IAT results that indicate they are
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significantly quicker to associate “Black people” with “bad” than with “good” will typically
deny that they assent to the proposition “Black people are bad”; perhaps they just couldn’t help
associating the two concepts under pressure. Moreover, as Devine (1989) points out, they could
attribute their results to a social context that presents Black people in a negative light, so that
they are only reflecting general social knowledge and not expressing any personal belief.
Alternatively, perhaps they aren’t aware of endorsing the proposition (Mandelbaum 2016), or
don’t endorse the proposition in a full-blooded way (Gendler 2008a, 2008b; Levy 2015).
However, perhaps part of the reason that implicit biases just seem so obviously nonpropositional is due to the fact that most measures are designed from a theoretical background
that assumes that implicit attitudes are associative (see Chapter 1). Mandelbaum (2016) develops
a philosophical case for an alternative theory — the Structured Belief hypothesis — citing
empirical support for his claims. I will focus on his account here because, along the way, I can
assess the psychological evidence he marshals. Mandelbaum identifies the dominant associative
strain in theorizing about implicit bias as the “theory of associative implicit bias” (AIB).
According to Mandelbaum, the AIB predicts specific empirical outcomes, but not only are those
results not found, the actual results turn out to be incompatible with AIB. His alternative is
Structured Belief, where implicit attitudes are “honest-to-god propositionally structured mental
representations that we bear the belief relation to” (7).
One of Mandelbaum’s key pieces of evidence is an experiment by Gawronski et al.
(2005), in which participants were presented with a photograph of a person who was unknown to
them (CS1). The participants were then presented with either a series of negative statements or a
series of positive statements alongside the photograph, conditioning the participants to like or to
dislike CS1. Then, participants were shown a photograph of a different person, also unknown to
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them (CS2), and told either that CS1 liked CS2 or CS1 disliked CS2. Finally, participants were
given an implicit priming task to test their attitudes toward CS1 and CS2. Mandelbaum points
out that an associative account would predict that if participants disliked CS1, and CS1 disliked
CS2, then subjects would dislike CS2. That is because associations are additive; negative plus
negative equals (more) negative. But these are not the results Gawronski et al. found.
Participants who were conditioned to dislike CS1, and told that CS1 disliked CS2, liked CS2
(according to the results of the final implicit priming task). Mandelbaum takes this as evidence
for Structured Belief, since the findings can be described in the following way: participants
unconsciously reasoned according to the principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
That is, participants reasoned in a propositionally structured way.
However, there are some problems with Mandelbaum’s interpretation. For one thing, it’s
unclear whether balance theory — the theoretical underpinning that predicts people will
conclude that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” — has adequate empirical support. More
pressingly, with respect to the specific experiment in Gawronski et al. (2005), participants had
time to integrate the explicitly available information about CS1’s dislike of CS2 and form a
judgment about the second face. Mandelbaum himself admits that he isn’t concerned about how
implicit attitudes are formed. However, it is not just the formation of implicit attitudes that is at
issue here, but their expression. It is well known in the implicit attitude literature that measures
reflect more than just implicit cognitive processes (for an overview, see Madva 2016a).
More damningly, Gawronski et al. (2005) also conduct a trial in which participants are
first told that CS1 either likes or dislikes CS2, and only then led to like or dislike CS1. If
Mandelbaum is correct that there is an underlying logical structure to implicit thought, such that
participants are unconsciously reasoning that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” then the
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order of the tasks should not affect subjects’ conclusions. In other words, the order in which they
learn that CS1 is an enemy and CS2 is an enemy should not affect their ability to follow the
logical form of the principle “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
To see the principle more clearly, we can formalize the argument:
P1. Eab
P2. Ebm
P3. (ForAllx)(ForAlly)((Exy & Eym) —> Fxm)
C1. Fam
Yet participants failed to come to the appropriate logical conclusion when task order was varied.
The conclusion of a piece of syllogistic reasoning does not depend on the order in which
premises are presented. The correct conclusion is C1 no matter whether P1 is presented first or
P2 is presented first.
Mandelbaum does not acknowledge this particular task when he reviews Gawronski et al.
(2005), but we can consider some responses that might be available to him. For one thing, maybe
the participants’ natural tendency to syllogistic reasoning with implicit attitudes is hampered
somehow in this situation. One might make an argument by analogy with the Wason Selection
Task, success at which requires correct syllogistic reasoning. Although people tend to fail the
Wason task when the cards display letters and numbers, they fare much better when the cards
mirror a real-world situation, like figuring out what information is needed to make sure anyone
drinking alcohol is over 21 years old. Cosmides & Tooby (1992) propose a “cheater detection
module” that comes into play, motivating people to ferret out potential cheaters (in this case, a
19-year-old trying to thwart the rule ‘you must be over 21 to consume alcohol’). This motivation
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in turn explains their increased success in syllogistic reasoning when the task concerns a social
scenario.
Likewise, one might argue there is some relevant difference between the orders in which
participants learn about CS1 and CS2. Maybe if I learn first that CS1 is my enemy, I am more
attentive to any further information about CS1, so that when I learn CS2 is the enemy of CS1, I
correctly conclude that CS2 is my friend. But maybe if I learn first that CS2 is an enemy of CS1,
I feel no connection to either person, so I am less attentive to or interested in the further
information that CS1 is my enemy. However, Gawronksi et al. do not mention any differences in
participant attention between the two conditions. Moreover, much more work would need to be
done to defend this argument, and the argument would inherit the well-known problems with the
“cheater detection module” explanation — most importantly, that it is objectionably ad hoc.
Mandelbaum also discusses evidence that seems to suggest implicit attitudes are able to
be modified by persuasive arguments. Since these arguments take propositions as premises, the
implicit attitudes that ae changed by these arguments must be propositional too. But this type of
change does not seem to be supported by the majority of the evidence. Our best evidence
suggests conscious commitments to change are important. However, this does not mean people
are directly changing their first-order implicit attitudes by challenging them with evidence;
rather, they are (for example) choosing to put themselves in situations where they are likelier to
behave in certain ways that align more tightly with their stated conscious values.
Gawronski & Srirathan (2010) summarize the research to date on persuasion and change
in implicit attitudes. two studies of implicit bias change (Brinol et al. 2002 and Tormala & Petty
2004) have shown that strong arguments elicit more positive implicit attitudes than weak
arguments do, while the valence of explicit attitudes is not affected by argument strength. More
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recently, Cao & Banaji (2016) find that learning counter-stereotypic information appropriately
updates people’s explicit beliefs but not their implicit attitudes. But we should expect neither of
these results if Mandelbaum’s propositional account is correct. More importantly for my
argument, the most effective approach is not to attempt to change implicit attitudes per se, but to
attempt to contain or prevent their expression.

2.3 Implicit Biases as Quasi-Belief or Sui Generis States
Tamar Gendler (2008a, 2008b) has proposed that we understand implicit bias by way of
associative representations she calls “aliefs” (she and others invoke aliefs to explain a wider
variety of phenomena, but the concept has been quite influential in the study of implicit bias).
Gendler introduces ‘alief’ by way of some illustrative examples. The “Grand Canyon walkway”
example is probably the most well-known. Imagine you are visiting the Grand Canyon, where a
transparent glass bridge allows you to walk 4000 feet above the canyon’s floor, almost as if you
were floating on thin air. Many visitors report being afraid to make the short journey despite
knowing that the walkway has been well engineered (as of this writing, it has been in operation
for 12 years). Moreover, they act as if they’re afraid: clutching side rails and security guards,
freezing in place, turning back in search of solid ground, and so on. Even those who make it to
the other side show signs of fear, like shortness of breath and an increased heart rate. But if our
beliefs guide our actions, the visitors’ behavior is strange and even irrational. They believe that
the walkway is perfectly safe, so they should act as if the walkway is like any other path they
believe to be safe, walking across with nary a second thought.
As Gendler points out, nobody finds this phenomenon surprising, because it is so
common; for example, many people have at least a mild fear of heights, so looking down at the
street from a window on the twentieth floor of a skyscraper might induce some fear or minor
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vertigo. But this is inconsistent with the considered belief, “this building is perfectly safe and
looking out the window cannot harm me.” So what is going on in these kinds of cases, where our
beliefs seem disconnected from our behavior? Gendler introduces the mental state ‘alief’ to
explain these sorts of phenomena. I believe the Grand Canyon walkway is safe, but I alieve
something else (Gendler suggests the alief’s content is something like, “Really high up, long
long way down. Not a safe place to be! Get off!!” [2008a, 635]4).
Gendler argues that the concept of ‘alief’ is useful for making sense of a wide range of
phenomena, among them implicit bias. She identifies the following as properties of aliefs: they
are automatic, associative, arational, shared by human and non-human animals, more primitive
than beliefs or desires, action-generating, and affect-laden (2008b, 557-8). Many of these are
properties that we have seen commonly attributed to implicit attitudes. Therefore, Gendler
subsumes implicit bias to her account, referring to racist implicit attitudes as “racist aliefs”
(2008b, 574). Recall the discussion in Chapter 1 that much of the development of psychological
tests for implicit attitudes was (and is) motivated by the well-known phenomenon in which
people tend to want to appear as egalitarian as possible, and moreover, by the robust evidence
that citizens of liberal democracies express more egalitarian explicit beliefs over time.
On the “racist alief” account of implicit racial bias, then, someone who genuinely
believes “Black people and White people are equal” may nevertheless sometimes alieve that
“Black people are dangerous” (as evidenced by performance on an IAT, shooter task, etc.).
Gendler is especially concerned with the implications that the unconscious or quasi-conscious
nature of aliefs has for attempts to reduce the effects of implicit bias. She concludes that

Gendler explains the caveman-like locution by noting that she is using ‘content’ in a rather
idiosyncratic way: “content need not be propositional, and may include…affective states and
behavioral dispositions” (2008a, 635, fn. 4).
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empirical evidence shows some promise for re-training techniques that can help us learn new
habits or ways of responding to situations that might elicit implicit biases (e.g., imagining
counterstereotypical examples of members of stereotyped groups; 576).
Gendler’s suggestions for reducing implicit bias are focused on the activation stage; e.g.,
“In the [past] 20 years…a great deal of research has been devoted to the topic of implicit
prejudice, and to the question of whether—and if so, how—automatic activation of stereotypical
responses can be controlled” (575). One line of techniques that Gendler considers is inspired by
an Aristotelian approach to habit formation: roughly, one learns (or becomes) by doing. Studies
like Kawamaki et al. (2000) find that stereotype activation is significantly reduced even 24 hours
after participants practice responding “NO” to category-stereotype pairings and “YES” to
category-nonstereotype pairings. The second type of technique recommended by Gendler is more
Cartesian in flavor, requiring exercises in mental imagery. She cites work by Blair (2002)
summarizing previous studies in which participants who had imagined a counter-stereotypical
“strong” woman displayed fewer automatically activated stereotypical associations than
participants who had engaged in other imaginative exercises or in none at all (Gendler 2008b,
576).
Gendler ends with a brief discussion of the “costs of disharmony in cases where our
ideals and social reality come apart” (576). Disharmony results when someone with explicit
egalitarian commitments nevertheless holds biased implicit associations. Although these
associations may simply reflect knowledge of the social world, they constitute “easily-andreadily-accessed alief[s]” (577) that require costly cognitive exertion to overcome — an
“epistemic cost of implicit bias,” as Gendler puts it.
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In a similar vein, Neil Levy argues that implicit biases are a sui generis mental state: not
beliefs and not associations, but something else. I discuss both Gendler’s and Levy’s accounts in
this section because, despite their differences, each locates implicit bias outside a standard
cognitive ontology by proposing a third kind of state (neither propositionally structured belief
nor “mere” association).
Levy (2015) argues that implicit biases are “patchy endorsements”: they count as
endorsements because they “have some propositional structure, which entails that they have
satisfaction conditions” and agents who hold them are thereby committed to the world being a
certain way (816). But they are also patchy because they don’t bear the same relationship to
beliefs and evidence as full-blown propositions. That is, any of our propositional beliefs can be
evaluated according to certain criteria, such as: how well does it cohere with our other beliefs?
When I acquire a new belief, how does it figure in updating my other beliefs? Implicit biases
behave differently. In the paradigmatic case of implicit bias, after all, I act in a biased manner
even though my considered beliefs are egalitarian.
Some of Levy’s observations about the nature of implicit bias are well supported by the
psychological literature; others, less so. Levy is right to note that implicit biases seem
heterogeneous, so that it is difficult to give an account capable of subsuming all instances of
implicit bias under a common cause or explanation. Even though all implicit biases have some
propositional content, he argues, it is likely that different types or tokens of implicit bias respond
in different ways to evidence, or figure in cognition and action in different ways. Given my
argument in Chapter 1, I agree that this is likely to be the case.
However, Levy is on less solid ground when he argues that implicit biases count as
endorsements because (in part) an agent who holds an implicit bias is committed to the world
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being a certain way. He points out that, on the associationist picture, we cannot impute such
commitments to agents. For example, if I take an IAT that reveals that I significantly more
quickly associate ‘overweight’ with ‘lazy’ than ‘underweight’ with ‘lazy,’ the mere fact that I
demonstrate that association in a specific experimental context is not ironclad proof that I judge
that overweight people are lazier than average-weight or underweight people. Recall Devine’s
point, discussed in Chapter 1, that such a test result could be interpreted in two ways: more
strongly, as evidence that I am somehow prejudiced against a group, or less strongly, as evidence
that I have learned and am aware of (but do not necessarily endorse) a common stereotype about
a social group.
If implicit biases are associations, then it seems we are justified only in making the
weaker claim: that I have knowledge of common social stereotypes, but may or may not actually
endorse those stereotypes. However, if implicit biases are more than mere associations, our
relationship to our biases is more complicated. If implicit biases are best understood as
propositions — or, on Levy’s account, having some propositional structure — then ‘overweight’
and ‘lazy’ will bear certain relations to each other for me.
Put another way: because associations are not propositions and do not stand in
propositional relations to each other, we cannot specify their content in any particular way absent
at least some particular context (Madva, 2017, has argued for the content indeterminism of
instances of implicit bias). I could give some shorthand for an association between ‘overweight’
and ‘lazy,’ but there is no reason to choose (a) ‘overweight people are lazy’ over, say, (b) ‘in
North America, there is a stereotype that overweight people are lazy.’ (Again, unless, as Madva
argues, we adopt an externalist view of implicit biases’ contents, so that in one context my token
implicit bias has content (a) and in another context my token has content (b).) However, if
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implicit biases are propositional, the categories and properties involved (e.g., ‘overweight’ and
‘lazy’) will bear specific relationships to each other. In a proposition relating a property to a
category, the proposition defines how the property relates to the category, not merely that it
relates. (Again, compare (a) and (b) above: in each proposition, the property ‘lazy’ is related to
the category ‘overweight people’ in a way that licenses different conclusions for each.)
Ultimately, despite Levy’s argument that implicit biases are “patchy endorsements,” there
is still empirical evidence suggesting that they have characteristically association-like
relationships to each other. For example, Cao & Banaji (2016) found that presenting participants
with counter-stereotypic information increased the strength of their implicit biases, at the same
time as they reversed their explicit judgments in accordance with the new information learned. If
implicit biases are propositions, we would expect that new information would update implicit
beliefs as well as explicit beliefs. However, if implicit biases are associations, one instance of
counter-stereotypic information would not be expected to alter an association. Huebner (2016)
argues that even the studies Levy cites on rational persuasion do not support the conclusion that
implicit bias is propositional, because when confronted with logical argument, participants may
increase their motivation or control rather than changing their underlying bias.

2.4 Denying the Implicit/Explicit Distinction
Edouard Machery (2017) sidesteps the debate about what kind of attitudes implicit biases
are by arguing that they are not attitudes at all. The dominant theories of psychology and
philosophy, according to Machery, paint a Freudian picture where attitudes accessible by
introspection and under conscious control “vie for the control of human behavior and psyche”
(107) with attitudes inaccessible to introspection and out of conscious control. Machery offers an
alternative on which (what we think of as) “implicit biases” are actually traits, not attitudes.
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Because someone either has a trait or lacks it, there is no implicit/explicit distinction for traits,
and so-called “implicit biases” are traits that might be opaque to us, or that might figure in to
judgments (e.g., “I am not a racist”).
Machery gives four arguments to build the case that the trait account of implicit biases is
superior to the attitude account. The overall argument relies on inference to the best explanation:
we have certain kinds of evidence about implicit bias, and the trait account explains them better
than the attitude account. For the sake of space, I focus on the two elements of the argument that
are most crucial: that there are low correlations between indirect measures of attitudes, and that
indirect measures have low predictive validity.
Machery criticizes the weak correlations found between different indirect measures of
attitudes. He cites Sherman et al. (2003), who find that correlations between implicit association
tests and evaluative priming tests are small and non-significant, falling between -0.11 to 0.11.
The proponent of the attitude account might reply5 by positing a different type of implicit
attitude to correspond to each measure of implicit bias, but Machery says this is “bad scientific
practice” (117).
What of Machery’s second argument, that indirect measures have low predictive validity?
As Machery points out, implicit bias has become a hot topic in philosophy and psychology over
the past decade or so, with “implicit attitudes…called on to explain many social ills” (119).
However, meta-analyses (Greenwald et al. 2009, Oswald et al. 2013) find “extremely low” (119)
predictive validity for the Implicit Association Test, and Machery notes that as of 2016, no metaanalyses for other measures seemed to exist. However, assuming that those meta-analyses would
Machery also notes that the defender of implicit attitudes could argue (1) low correlations are
due to low reliability or (2) that only one measure of implicit biases truly measures implicit bias
(117), but each of these arguments is fairly weak and it seems unlikely that proponents of
attitude theories would defend them.
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show results similar to the IAT meta-analyses, it seems implicit bias is not particularly
predictive. If so, the trait picture is a better model for these results, because an implicit measure
could isolate any one of a number of states — associations, emotions, beliefs, etc. — that
contribute to “implicitly biased” behavior. Therefore, we should expect a relatively low
predictive validity from any one measure; after all, the measure is tracking only one aspect of a
complex set of behavioral inputs. The Freudian picture, on the other hand, holds that measures
like the IAT tap into a single kind of mental state (an implicit attitude). If an isolable attitude is
the sole determinant of implicit bias, then we should expect a higher predictive validity when
that attitude is measured.
An example will help to illustrate what Machery has in mind. Consider someone who
thinks of herself as courageous and describes herself as courageous to others. However,
whenever she finds herself in a dangerous situation where she could demonstrate courage, she
instead shows cowardice. Moreover, she genuinely believes that she is a courageous person, and
wants to act in courageous ways. Machery himself gives the example of courage as a
paradigmatic trait: it is dispositional, both behaviorally and psychologically, and manifests
differently in different situations. That is, traits are dispositions to behave in certain ways, but
also to have psychological states like “emotions, attention patterns, beliefs, desires, and so on”
(111).
How persuasive are Machery’s arguments regarding indirect measures’ variable
correlations and low predictive validity? It is true that correlations between different measures of
implicit bias are relatively low compared to correlations between different measures of other
psychological constructs (e.g., IQ). But there is an important caveat that Machery does not
address: studies can be compared with each other in a number of ways. One could compute, say,
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the correlation between IAT tests and AMP tests by taking a sample of each across different
subject matters. However, it is plausible that we will find different correlations between the IAT
and AMP for, say, race than for politics. Therefore, averaging all correlations between all tests
over different subjects of bias runs the risk of masking correlations that may exist.
For this reason, Bar-Anan and Nosek (2014) investigate seven kinds of indirect measures,
along with a direct measure, comparing how well each correlates with the others within a
particular subject matter. They find that while the indirect and direct measures correlated with
each other for all topics, these correlations were much stronger for some topics than for others.
Measures that probed political attitudes showed strong correlations, while measures of racial bias
were more moderate, and measures of self-esteem weakest of all. They propose that “some of the
source of variation in reliability and predictive validity of indirect measures is a function of the
concepts rather than the methods.” (2). Therefore, Machery’s conclusion about correlations
among different indirect measures is premature at best.
Machery also argues that the low predictive validity of implicit bias measures speaks in
favor of the trait model. However, the issue of predictive validity is somewhat more complicated
than he credits. It is true that indirect measures of bias do not seem to predict individual behavior
particularly well. But there are two responses available: (1) we should not expect a particularly
strong correlation between implicit bias and individual behavior even on the attitude model; (2)
the right place to look for a correlation may be between implicit bias and group behavior.
First, despite what Machery claims, the attitude model does not necessarily predict a
strong correlation between an individual’s score on an implicit bias measure and her behavior.
Greenwald, Banaji & Nosek (2015) develop the notion of “consequential validity,” first defined
by Messick (1995) as a way to capture the fact that statistically insignificant findings can
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nevertheless have socially significant consequences. It is important to remember that statistical
significance is different from practical significance. I could run a series of experiments and
discover that my cat is (statistically) significantly more likely to allow me to dress her in a
sweater after I have offered her chicken treats as opposed to salmon treats or no treats. However,
this finding is of little practical significance (except perhaps to my cat) and lacks consequential
validity. Similarly, a result could have great practical significance even if its statistical
significance is unimpressive.
Such is the case, Greenwald et al. argue, for implicit bias. As a concrete example, they
consider racial profiling in the New York City Police Department (NYPD). Let’s assume a small
effect size for implicit bias of r = 0.148 (as found in Oswald et al. 2013 and cited by Machery as
evidence that the IAT’s “extremely low” effect sizes mean that it does not predict behavior well
[2013, 119]). Greenwald et al. calculate that if police officers’ IAT scores were reduced by just
one standard deviation, the difference between the numbers of NYPD stops targeting Black
people and targeting White people would decrease by 9,976 per year, or 5.7% of total stops
(558). Surely this number is significant to Black New Yorkers disproportionately targeted by
police. Greenwald et al. also draw attention to negative effects on individuals who are repeatedly
subjected to instances of implicit bias. For example, even low effects of implicit bias on
interviewing, hiring, and promotion decisions can create large cumulative disadvantages over an
individual’s career, which can be modeled mathematically (558). Both of these examples suggest
that group behavior may be the relevant locus for assessing the practical impact of implicit bias.
Even if individuals’ scores are variable and do not have great predictive power over their
personal behavior, the fact that so many people hold similar implicit biases produces a snowball
effect that leads to discriminatory outcomes, which can be quantified.
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2.5 Activation, Expression, and Scrupulosity
Given the sheer number of the accounts on offer, we might well despair about our
prospects for combatting implicit bias. But the messiness of determining the metaphysics of
implicit bias need not interfere with the goal of reducing the unsavory consequences of implicit
biases. First, the variety of research projects on implicit bias and possible interventions is healthy
for a research program that is relatively new. Even if we disagree about the metaphysical
foundations, we can learn about what works and what doesn't in terms of reducing unwanted
consequences of implicit bias.
We should also pay attention to the growing literature that suggests that the most
effective place to intervene is between activation and expression/application. Krieglmeyer &
Sherman (2012) define stereotype activation as “increased accessibility of knowledge about
social groups” and stereotype application as “the use of this knowledge in perception and
judgment” (1) If this is so, then we don’t need to fret so much about which account of implicit
bias is correct in order to reduce unwanted consequences. For it turns out that however biases are
activated, there are steps we can take to dampen their expression/application in situations where
we want to avoid acting on the basis of an implicit bias, and it is the behavioral expression of
implicit bias we should be most concerned about.
Indeed, Rivers et al. (2019) investigate whether a reduction in biased behavior over a
short time interval is due primarily to a reduction in stereotype activation or a suppression in
stereotype application. By testing recognition memory for primes, they find that as time
increases between a prime and a judgment, stereotype application decreases at the same time as
activation increases.

44

Also consider a more conceptual point to help disentangle the moral relevance of
activation versus expression. Summers & Sinnott-Armstrong (2015) ask whether the morally
scrupulous are morally responsible. Scrupulosity, which is sometimes a symptom of obsessivecompulsive disorder, involves “seeing sin [or immorality] where there is none” (950) and is
associated with “moral perfectionism [and] chronic moral doubt” (951). In one case study, a
patient named Bridget crosses herself and prays compulsively whenever an ambulance passes
and becomes extremely distressed if she is driving and unable to perform these behaviors.
Bridget is convinced that illness or death will befall the ambulance passenger if she cannot
complete her rituals, and that she would be responsible for the misfortune (947-48). Summers &
Sinnott-Armstrong argue that the scrupulous person has reduced moral responsibility due to her
condition; she cannot appropriately appreciate moral reasons.
Now think of someone — call her Jo — who is scrupulous with respect to implicit biases.
Jo examines interpersonal interactions with an eye toward whether she has unwittingly
perpetuated bias. She constantly apologizes for any potential slight and explains that she does not
mean to behave in a biased way, but that implicit bias can strike at any time. She is driven
largely by anxious thoughts that she is responsible for incidents of racism, sexism, etc. that she
cannot always recognize. Plausibly, Jo does express implicit bias (just like anyone), and actually
increases her biased behavior thanks to her overweening conscientiousness. For example, if she
is especially scrupulous about ableism, a disabled friend — call him Mo — may find her
excessive attentions patronizing, while Jo believes she must pay extra attention to either avoid or
preemptively “atone” for her potentially biased actions. So, for example, if Jo texts Mo with an
exhaustive list of nearby restaurants and their disability accommodations before making lunch
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plans because she would be horrified if her suggested restaurant is not ADA compliant, Mo may
reasonably infer that Jo is expressing implicit bias (e.g., “disabled people are helpless”).
I bring up the case of Jo not to argue whether or not she is morally responsible, but to
make a point about the moral relevance of the distinction between activation and application. Jo
could act as she does with little or no activation of implicit bias, especially if she has a habit of
acting as she does. On the other hand, it appears that Jo expresses implicit bias in her behavior,
even if she would disavow a proposition like “disabled people are helpless.” If we are concerned
with the effects of implicit bias, we would do well to attend to the ways in which someone like
Jo could contribute to incidents of implicit bias.
In the next chapter, I consider further how stereotypes should be morally evaluated.
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Chapter 3: What’s Wrong with Stereotyping?
Psychologists and other social scientists have long recognized the importance of studying
stereotypes. Some research questions about stereotypes are of intrinsic interest; for example, why
are some generalizations but not others calcified into stereotypes? But many questions are also
socially and morally significant. Given that most people consider it wrong to stereotype others, at
least in certain contexts, what exactly is the harm of stereotyping? If stereotyping is wrong, are
all stereotypes harmful in the same way, or is each stereotype harmful in its own way? Are there
any situations where stereotyping is morally permissible or even mandatory? And if stereotyping
is at least sometimes wrong, how can we mitigate its negative social effects?
These questions are especially salient for current social and political debates surrounding
racial profiling, practices of policing and jailing, and norms of gender and sexuality. For
example, although New York City’s “stop-and-frisk” policing was ruled unconstitutional for its
blatant use of racial profiling, many White Americans continue to express support for racial
profiling based on stereotypes that associate Black Americans with criminal behavior. Likewise,
many Americans oppose “bathroom bills,” which allow people to use the bathroom that
conforms to their gender identity, by claiming that trans women are “actually men” who would
pose physical danger to women if allowed legal use of women’s bathrooms. This assessment
often appears to rest on stereotypes about who counts as a man and who counts as a woman (as
well as the stereotype that men are aggressive and threatening).
While there is a great deal of psychological research on stereotypes, most related
philosophical research has focused on the downstream effects of stereotyping, e.g., stereotype
threat and implicit bias. The philosophical research that does attend to stereotypes themselves
tends primarily to be concerned with the ethical evaluation of stereotyping (Blum 2004, Beeghly
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2015, Hosein forthcoming). This work tends to take one of two positions: (1) stereotyping is
wrong insofar as it leads to judging individuals as group representatives rather than as unique
people (cf. Blum 2004); (2) stereotyping is a morally innocent act in and of itself, and any harms
attached are not due to the mere act of stereotyping (Beeghly 2015).
This chapter argues that ethical evaluations of stereotyping have tended to overlook the ways
in which stereotyping is prone not just to lead to inaccurate judgments in certain circumstances,
but to supply inaccurate explanations. In turn, these explanations often serve to conceal the
origins and social functions of stereotypes. The goal of this chapter is not to adjudicate the
ethical status of stereotyping. Rather, the goal is to see more clearly how stereotyping is prone to
lead to epistemic errors that may increase the likelihood of not only wronging individuals but
participating in structural wrongs.

3.1 What Is a Stereotype?
In the simplest terms, a stereotype is a generalization about a social group, often taking the
form of a generic statement, and often the subject of more or less widespread agreement (to be
discussed more later): “Women are poor spatial reasoners”; “Men are aggressive”; “Asian
students excel at math.” However, not all generalizations are stereotypes. “Ticks carry Lyme
disease” is a generalization that nevertheless fails to be a stereotype. So is “Torontonians make
$75,000 a year.”
Note that these generalizations fail to be stereotypes in different ways. “Ticks carry Lyme
disease” is considered by most people to be a true generalization, despite the fact that most ticks
do not carry Lyme disease (as Sarah-Jane Leslie explains, having Lyme disease is treated as an
especially salient feature of ticks because Lyme disease is so dangerous to humans). However, it
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fails to be a stereotype. Why? Although most people would agree that ticks carry Lyme disease,
this is not a generalization about a social group.
“Torontonians make $75,000 a year” is a generalization about a social group, and a true one
(if we take it to mean “the mean household income in Toronto is roughly $75,000 a year”).
However, it is not clear that this generalization rises to the level of a stereotype. At least, the
stereotypes that interest me for the purposes of this paper are those that (a) are widely held
among a community and (b) can figure in to practical reasoning and decision-making, even at a
subconscious level. How exactly stereotypes contribute to other cognitive states and to decisionmaking is the topic of Section III.
Finally, I do not assume that stereotypes are always false; that they are mostly false; that they
are always pernicious; or that they are usually pernicious. Like Beeghly (2015), I acknowledge
the value of starting from a descriptive point of view. In trying to figure out what kinds of roles
stereotypes play in cognition, it will not be useful to prejudge whether stereotypes are bad or
good. In other words, the moral valence of stereotypes is a question that merits careful attention.

3.2 Social Roles of Stereotypes
Stereotypes can serve many purposes: guiding decision-making; justifying past actions;
supporting the status quo, and so on. In this section and the next, I attempt to individuate kinds of
stereotypes based on the functional roles they play, with an eye toward identifying any harm(s)
characteristic of each kind of stereotype. The previous philosophical literature on stereotypes has
tended to treat all stereotypes as more or less alike; Blum (2004) argues that stereotypes are
harmful insofar as they lead us to treat individuals as representatives of a group rather than as
unique people, while Beeghly (2015) calls for a descriptive view of stereotypes, on which
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stereotypes are best seen as non-normative and the harm(s) of stereotypes, if any, are
heterogeneous.
Stereotypes do not exist in a vacuum. To some extent, as noted above, my definition of
'stereotype' is stipulative. Perhaps private stereotypes exist, but a private stereotype seems rather
like a private language. It seems central to the concept of 'stereotype' -- any interesting concept
of 'stereotype' -- that it concern some information that is transmitted socially. When considering
the possible harm(s) of stereotyping, we are primarily concerned with harms visited upon one
group or individual by another, on the basis of that group or individual’s perceived social
standing.
Stereotypes are pervasive; for any given social group, it is not difficult to get most people to
write a list of characteristics stereotypically associated with that group, even if they disagree that
those characteristics apply. Indeed, participants in stereotyping studies sometimes signal their
dissatisfaction with completing the required tasks by pointing to social judgments they consider
objectionable in and of themselves. A representative participant in 1950 writes: "I refuse to be a
part of a childish game like this.... I can think of no distinguishing characteristics which will
apply to any group as a whole" (Gilbert 1951, cited in Allport 1954/1979). This was in stark
contrast to an earlier 1932 study where subjects willingly listed characteristics of groups like
“Jews” or “Italians.” If anything, the notion that stereotyping is inherently wrong has only
intensified since 1950.
So what functions do stereotypes play in a society if most members of that society disavow
stereotyping? First, the disgruntled participant in Gilbert's 1950 study is likely deluding himself;
even if he does not wish to endorse any particular stereotype(s), he would likely be able to list
characteristics commonly associated with social groups, which was the experimental task. So
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perhaps one social function of stereotypes is to make it easier to communicate information about
groups.
Stereotypes can also provide explanations for large-scale events, justify collective actions,
and promote in-group cohesion (Oakes, Haslam & Turner 1994). It is important to note that
people's stereotypes do not appear from thin air, nor are they formed on the basis of direct
observation. As Allport demonstrated, stereotypes (national, racial, gendered...) are taught to
children by their parents and their textbooks, even if unwittingly. Although Allport's
groundbreaking studies of prejudice took place within a framework of "love-prejudice" toward
an in-group and "hate-prejudice” toward an outgroup, more recent developments in psychology
have shown that stereotyping is a more nuanced affair (Jost, Banaji & Nosek 2004).
Yet another social function of stereotypes is to support the status quo — the current social
hierarchy. Even if an individual wishes to distance herself from stereotypes, the world is often
structured in such a way as to make the stereotypes true, or to make them appear true, or at least
not to contradict them. In turn, by relying on stereotypes, we help make it the case that the world
appears to conform to those stereotypes.
Consider the case of Dr. Tamika Cross, a passenger on a Delta flight in October 2016 who
responded to a flight attendant’s call for medical assistance for another passenger. Cross
answered the routine questions the attendant asked (e.g., “Where did you go to medical school?”)
but the attendant told her that she needed a “real” doctor. The attendant also called Cross
“sweetie” while refusing Cross’ medical expertise. While the two were speaking, a White man
announced himself as a physician. The flight attendant took the man at his word, leading him to
the passenger in need of medical attention (Hawkins 2016). (Dr. Ashley Denmark tells a similar
story about her experience on another Delta flight, where she was regarded with suspicion and
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skipped over in favor of two White nurses; this and similar accounts are relayed in Wible 2016.)
We don’t know exactly what the flight attendant was thinking, but it is possible that she did not
consciously hold racist beliefs while interacting with Cross. Even as racism persists, it has in
general become more socially unacceptable to openly espouse a racist ideology.
It is especially important, then, to note the system-justifying work that stereotypes perform.
Stereotypes are not just generalizations about groups and their members. They tend to preserve
the status quo of social hierarchies in a number of ways. Psychological studies conducted under
the umbrella of "system justification theory,” first proposed by Jost & Banaji (1994), can
illuminate this process. System justification theory predicts behavior that theories like Allport's,
and other social psychologists' since, have trouble accounting for. For example, social identity
theory expands on Allport's "love-prejudice"/"hate-prejudice" model to predict that people have
favorable attitudes toward their in-group and neutral to unfavorable attitudes toward out-groups.
But then it is puzzling why members of low-status groups so often harbor negative feelings
toward and judgments about their own in-groups. Examples abound. The group Concerned
Women for America opposes feminist measures that would expand legal rights for women;
people of low socioeconomic status regularly support political positions like regressive taxation
that ultimately harm their own economic interests (of course, people have interests other than
economic ones, interests which might override their economic interests at election time. But
there are also people who for ideological reasons support policies that would harm their
economic standing.)
These apparent contradictions can be explained by the system-justifying role of stereotypes.
"Everyone...is both a victim and a supporter of the system" (Havel 1985; quoted in Jost et al.
2004, 909). In other words, people use stereotypes to maintain social hierarchies, even when
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objectively they would be better off if those hierarchies were dissolved. And we help make it the
case that the world continues to be structured in that way. Consider again the case of Dr. Tamika
Cross. The flight attendant’s stereotype of “doctor” (and perhaps her stereotype of “Black
woman”) prevented her from seeing Cross as a doctor, even though Cross told the attendant over
and over that she was in fact a doctor. But the attendant’s stereotype of “doctor” allowed her to
immediately recognize the White man as a doctor. Because Cross was not recognized as a
doctor, she was forbidden from playing the role of a doctor — in this case, providing medical
assistance to an unwell passenger. The attendant’s refusal to recognize Cross’ medical expertise
reinforced that doctors are not Black women. At the same time, the attendant was responsive to a
widespread social stereotype that informs Americans that doctors are not Black women.
Cross was kept from practicing as a doctor for only a short period of time on this flight, but
the example generalizes. Participants in other unjust social structures take actions that affirm
those structures, even if unwittingly. A medical school admissions officer might bemoan the lack
of qualified Latina applicants after she has discarded a stack of applications from qualified
Latinas, not realizing that she holds them to higher standards than she holds applicants with
names that sound stereotypically White. The admissions officer conforms to and perpetuates
social stereotypes about doctors. My interest in this paper is not to apportion blame, although the
question of responsibility is an interesting one. Rather, I want to stress the role that stereotypes
play as justifiers of the status quo.
First, however, I want to make a point about the wrong of stereotyping in the case of Dr.
Cross. One might argue that no wrong was done here, or that the wrong was very minor. Cross
and her fellow physician were passengers on the plane and not (for example) candidates for a
prestigious job. In being passed over, no serious wrong came to Cross. If no other doctor had
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been present, in fact, the most serious harm would have come to the patient, who would have
been deprived of needed medical care. I resist this interpretation and argue that the attendant’s
behavior toward Cross did wrong Cross. The attendant’s behavior threatened Cross’ identity as a
doctor, one of whose roles is to provide medical assistance where possible, which is a privilege
at the same time as it is a service. Part of the privilege consists in being recognized as having a
certain expertise and therefore status. Moreover, in being guided by the stereotype of “doctor,”
the attendant helped make it the case that Cross could not fulfill at least part of her role as a
doctor. I return to this point in the next section, when I discuss the wrong(s) of stereotyping more
fully.

3.3 Cognitive Roles of Stereotypes
There are many theories about the cognitive functions that stereotypes play. For example, it
is common to suggest that stereotypes are invaluable because they enable people to create
meaning by assigning new stimuli to already existing categories, which in turn allows for quick
decision-making (Oakes, Haslam & Turner 1994, 85) Stereotypes also play a motivational role,
"representing and preserving important social values" (85). So, we cannot cleanly separate the
social and cognitive roles of stereotypes. Still, we can ask how stereotypes figure in cognition as
opposed to other kinds of beliefs (or desires, etc.).
Indeed, stereotypes are often referred to as "beliefs.” This is natural enough; the earliest
studies of stereotyping asked subjects to list traits characteristic of given groups, effectively
probing them for beliefs like "The Irish are drunkards." However, there is an important
distinction to be made here between awareness of stereotypes and endorsement of stereotypes. It
is possible for someone to be aware that, socially, groups tend to be associated with certain
characteristics, without personally endorsing the truth of the proposition expressing that
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association. Someone might refuse to endorse that the Irish are drunkards, either because she
believes that this is an incorrect generalization or because she considers it impolite to say even
though she believes it to be true. The subject who refused to participate in Gilbert's "childish
game" could likewise have said that he could think of no group-based generalizations either
because he believed that no such generalizations existed or because he felt it socially
unacceptable to identify stereotyped associations at all.
Psychologists distinguish between "descriptive" and "prescriptive" stereotypes. Descriptive
stereotypes are meant to describe how group members actually are; prescriptive stereotypes
convey standards about what group members should be like (Burgess & Borgida 1999; Gill
2004, 619). The Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) is a relatively early example of psychologists’
interest in prescriptive stereotypes. Bem (1974; see also Bem 1981) developed an inventory of
masculine and feminine stereotypes by asking participants (male and female) to list traits
considered socially desirable in men and in women (validated by Harris 1994; Holt & Ellis 1996;
Auster & Ohm 2000; and Prentice & Carranza 2002, who explored proscriptive as well as
prescriptive stereotypes]
The distinction between descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes has played an especially
important role in legal arguments about discriminatory intentions and effects. Burgess & Borgida
(1999) found that descriptive stereotypes are responsible for disparate impact while prescriptive
stereotypes lead to disparate treatment. The evidence regarding descriptive and prescriptive
stereotypes was first considered by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989)
when the American Psychological Association filed an amicus brief. Because legal cases provide
well-documented and detailed case studies, it will be helpful to analyze two in particular to
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understand the differences between descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping, as well as the
different effects each has on targeted groups.
The facts of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and another gender discrimination case, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1988), illustrate how
descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes work differently to subordinate group members (in this
case, women). In EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the EEOC charged Sears with discrimination
against women in two areas: commission sales and office job wages. Sears, the EEOC alleged,
disproportionately assigned men to sell more expensive appliances that netted higher
commission payouts; it also paid male office workers more than female office workers. Sears
defended itself by claiming that “women preferred the noncommission areas…. Either by
training or prior experience or just as a matter of likes and dislikes, many women preferred
working with the fashion side of the store rather than in areas such as appliances, stereos, and
carpets” quoted in Cooper 1986, 754, fn. 5). In other words, Sears argued that it was not
discriminating against women as a matter of company policy; in fact, it was not discriminating
against women at all. Women simply preferred to work in traditionally feminine occupations.
However, Sears also argued that its hiring policies merely reflected American social mores; it
was therefore acting no differently than other companies. Briefs filed by women’s historians on
behalf of both the plaintiff and the defendant emphasized their respective takes on the facts of
women’s employment preferences. This is a case, then, that hinges largely on descriptive
stereotypes of women: women are this way (have certain preferences), so we are treating them
this way (satisfying those preferences). This is a case of disparate impact because men and
women were hired for different jobs. The next case I will discuss demonstrates the effects of
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prescriptive stereotyping, namely, disparate treatment: when men and women are hired for
similar jobs and then treated differently because of gender.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the first Supreme Court case in which parties cited
psychological research, Ann Hopkins alleged that she was denied promotion to partner at Price
Waterhouse due to her gender. Hopkins had an impressive record; she had brought $25 million in
business to Price Waterhouse, she had logged more billable hours than anyone else considered
for partnership, and she was generally well-regarded by clients and colleagues. It seemed that her
gender had played a role in the decision not to make her partner, so she brought a gender
discrimination lawsuit. Price Waterhouse claimed in response that Hopkins had interpersonal
problems; she had been accused of offenses ranging from being too “macho” to not dressing in a
“feminine” enough manner. (Fiske et al. 1991, 1050).
There are some commonalities to the stereotyping that took place in each case. First, each
case concerns, at least in part, the actions of individuals who had to make decisions about other
individuals. It is true that in EEOC, the hiring managers’ judgments were based on very limited
information, whereas in Price Waterhouse, the partners had quite a bit more information.
Nevertheless, in each case, people charged with making a decision were acting on less than
complete information about an individual. Social psychology’s research program explores how
stereotypes work to aid in explanation; act as energy-saving devices by simplifying the
environment; and function as shared group beliefs (McGarty et al. 2). The discussion in Section
II explored the group-belief and explanation aspects of stereotypes. But stereotypes can also help
us, as individual cognizers awash in a sea of stimuli, choose the most relevant information for
our purposes. They narrow the number of “inputs” we must pay attention to in social interaction,
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and they “bring together shared knowledge and current input in a form which both makes sense
of the world and facilitates our goals within it” (Oakes, Haslam & Turner 1994, 125).
Let’s return to the details of EEOC and Price Waterhouse. In EEOC, women weren’t hired
for stereotype-incongruent jobs in the first place. Why did women not fit in to the stereotype of
“commission sales staff”? There are probably a number of reasons, but an important piece of
evidence in the trial was Sears’ own hiring manual, which emphasized blatantly “masculine”
qualities. The manual suggested that “a good commission salesperson possesses a lot of drive
and physical vigor, is socially dominant, and has an outgoing personality and the ability to
approach easily persons they do not know” (EEOC v. Sears, 1290). Questions intended to assess
the applicant’s fit for a commission job included, “Do you have a low pitched voice?” and “Have
you played on a football team?” (fn. 29). Most initial interviewers were women (1291). It is
consistent with the facts of the case that interviewers did not have any explicit bias against hiring
women for commission-based jobs. (Research confirms that women generally hold fewer explicit
negative stereotypes about women than men do.) But, nevertheless, it appears that the company
conducted its interviews for the commission sales force according to descriptive stereotypes
about women, e.g., women don’t have “physical vigor,” are not “dominant,” etc. It seems that
women simply were not considered for the jobs in the first place (rather than being hired and
facing discrimination later). This is consistent with psychologists’ understanding of descriptive
stereotypes. They are often implicit, operating below the surface of conscious thought. Although
there are negative consequences (selling makeup is less profitable than selling large appliances),
they are due to a judgment of mismatch between an individual and a category, rather than a
judgment that an individual ought to be a certain way.
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In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was the target of discrimination because she violated
expectations of what a woman should be like. Hopkins was assertive, competent, and effective in
her job. This clashes with stereotypes that women are passive, incompetent, and ineffective.
Negative judgments about Hopkins’ candidacy for partner also had their basis in incomplete
evidence or even falsehoods. Even though Hopkins’ clients and peers rated her positively, some
employees described her as “universally disliked” (Fiske et al. 1991, 1051). Moreover, these
judgments were made by male colleagues and senior partners. It is notable that senior partners
made explicitly prejudicial statements about women, as when one partner complained that
women should stop being proposed for partnership when they were not even qualified to be
managers. No one contradicted the senior partner on this point, and indeed Price Waterhouse had
no company policy prohibiting sex- (and race-) based discrimination (1051). The senior partners’
prescriptive stereotypes about women were such that they judged Hopkins a poor fit as a partner
because she did not match their judgments of what women ought to be like (and their judgments
of what partners ought to be like). This is so even though, objectively, she did match the “senior
partner” job description! However, stereotypes about women and about successful businessmen
led the senior partners to make an inaccurate judgment.
Here’s one story we could tell about descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes: descriptive
stereotypes are “cold,” implicit, and do not necessarily lead to action. On the other hand,
prescriptive stereotypes are “hot,” explicit, and figure directly in to decision-making. But before
drawing conclusions about how descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes figure in to other
cognitive states (and ultimately, decision-making and action), we should also note that we can
individuate stereotypes based on the valence of their content. Much stereotype research centers
around the “Big Two” (compare the “Big Five” of personality research): warmth and
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competence. This is the Stereotype Content Model. Warmth includes qualities like friendliness
and trustworthiness, while competence includes skillfulness and access to resources. Warmth is
associated with intent (friend or foe?) and competence has to do with perceived ability to act on
intent (Fiske 2015; Yzerbyt 2016, 90). The combination of high warmth and high competence
evokes admiration, while other combinations elicit envy (high competence/low warmth),
contempt (low competence/low warmth) and pity (high warmth/low competence).
Note that on the Stereotype Content Model, even descriptive stereotypes (”women prefer to
sell in low-stakes situations”) contain evaluative content. We have seen how prescriptive
stereotypes, which clearly have evaluative content, can support unjust social structures. But if
descriptive stereotypes also have evaluative content (”this person is warm but incompetent”) then
their connection to action becomes clearer. One might object that descriptive stereotypes have
only very thin evaluative content, if they have it at all. For example, “women are better than men
at selling makeup” might be considered a relatively unobjectionable generalization. But here the
context-dependence of stereotypes comes into play. Stereotypes are activated against a
background of knowledge and goals. The question then becomes, “what is this person good or
bad for?” In the Sears case, where there were two options for sales workers, an apparently
innocuous generalization about women systematically pushed them into lower paying jobs.
Again, descriptive stereotypes should be evaluated not just on the basis of their apparent content
shorn of social context, but with the understanding that stereotypes facilitate judgment and action
in particular situations.
Prescriptive stereotypes appear to be more closely tied to affect than descriptive stereotypes
are. Often, discussions of prescriptive stereotypes emphasize their negative affective
components: that women are judged incompetent, bitchy, etc. But studies that distinguish
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benevolent sexism from hostile sexism show that prescriptive stereotypes can have positive
affective content too. Consider Paul Ryan’s statement that “women are to be championed and
revered.” These prescriptions, whether positive or negative, elicit strong emotions and can lead
to actions like backlash against highly competent members of minority groups.
Because descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes appear to play different functional roles in
cognition and action, and because prescriptive stereotypes figure so much into obviously
discriminatory treatment, it is tempting to conclude that we should look primarily to prescriptive
stereotypes when we attempt to define the harms of stereotyping. After all, Price Waterhouse’s
treatment of Ann Hopkins seems more obviously wrong than Sears’ hiring policies. (The courts
agreed: Sears was found not liable for discrimination due to a lack of evidence that it was acting
in an intentionally wrongful way, while Hopkins won her suit.) Cases like Hopkins’ seem to
demonstrate that prescriptive stereotypes play a special role in maintaining the status quo; this is
a common conclusion from social psychologists (cf. Prentice & Carranza 2002).
Let’s return to the case of Dr. Tamika Cross. The flight attendant conceivably did not draw
on explicitly racist beliefs when she barred Dr. Cross from attending to the passenger. Yet her
actions supported a status quo in which Black women do not count as doctors. Assuming that the
attendant drew on implicit beliefs, her beliefs served a system-justifying role in at least two
ways: (1) they prevented her from attending to relevant evidence that contradicted her implicit
beliefs; (2) they were likely invisible to her, being outside of conscious awareness. We noted in
the previous section that blatant stereotyping is generally discouraged in (though by no means
absent from) most social interactions. The apparently Mad Men-like office environment of Price
Waterhouse is a memory for many employees and was never experienced by many others. But
the effects of descriptive stereotyping are harder to identify and correct for. Even when behavior
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is motivated by a descriptive stereotype, other possible explanations are often deployed to
minimize or eliminate any acknowledgment that the behavior was actually caused by a
stereotype. The phenomenon of “colorblindness” shows that intentionality is often considered a
necessary component of racist words or deeds: if you didn’t mean it to be racist, it wasn’t racist.
However, as many activists and scholars have noted, individual intention is not a necessary
ingredient for the perpetuation of oppressive structures. Indeed, there is something particularly
troubling about the invisibility of descriptive stereotypes. They appear unbidden and are largely
unresponsive to rational persuasion. These features of descriptive stereotypes make them
especially likely (1) to be employed as system-justifiers; (2) not to be recognized or challenged
as system-justifiers.

3.4 The Harm of Stereotyping
I have referred to the harm that stereotyping does by perpetuating unjust social structures.
But what exactly is the harm or wrong here? I am inclined to think that, while we may
distinguish a number of harms associated with stereotyping, these harms stem from the wrongful
dehumanization of the stereotyped group or person.
The classic view, defended most recently by Blum (2004), has it that stereotyping always
involves a moral wrong: “being seen as an individual is an important form of acknowledgment of
persons, failure of such acknowledgment is a moral fault and constitutes a bad of all
stereotyping” (Blum 2004, 272–73). Therefore, “independent of any further bad consequences,
stereotyping constitutes a form of disrespect, a way of misrelating to the stereotyped other”
(282). But as Beeghly (2015) points out, it is not always morally wrong to treat someone
primarily as a member of a larger group, rather than as a unique individual about whom no
assumptions can be made on the basis of perceived group membership. She gives the example of
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someone seeking urgent medical assistance. Calling “Doctor! We need a doctor!” in an
emergency room and pointing to someone in a white coat seems morally unproblematic. Yet it is
clearly a case of treating someone as a member of a group first and as an individual second (if at
all). What is relevant to the person calling for a doctor is the social role the doctor fulfills.
However, Blum understates the harms associated with stereotyping. He speaks of the
importance of “being seen as an individual” and being related to properly. I agree with Beeghly
that, as it is, Blum’s account is unsatisfactory. For instance, a convenience store clerk who
refuses to sell alcohol to a minor does so on the basis of the minor’s membership in a group
restricted by law from buying alcohol. Carding a minor, and refusing to sell her alcohol because
her license reveals she is 19 years old, does not involve treating her as an individual. (Let’s grant
for the sake of argument that this is an instance of stereotyping.) But, in and of itself, it is hard to
see how this specific failure to treat her as an individual (perhaps she is Canadian, where the
drinking age is 19, and she always imbibes responsibly) constitutes a form of disrespect. Indeed,
perhaps the clerk knows that liquor laws are never enforced in this part of town, and her boss has
instructed her to keep sales up by declining to card customers. Nevertheless, she is concerned
about the welfare of teenagers and decides to card young-looking people anyway. In this case,
treating the 19-year-old as a group member and not an individual could actually stem from the
clerk’s respect for her; she refuses to treat the 19-year-old as a means to increase the store’s
profit. So Blum’s focus on being seen and related to as an individual misses the mark.
Rather, I think what we want to say is that stereotyping leads to harm insofar as it tends to
dehumanize members of the target group. This is consistent with the possibility that some
stereotypes do not dehumanize the target group. We can see some parallels in philosophical and
legal treatments of the harms of discrimination. For example, Hellman (2008) argues that, while
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not all discrimination is wrongful, wrongful discrimination demeans people by treating them as
less than moral equals. Consider also Anderson’s (1999) defense of democratic egalitarianism
against luck egalitarianism: “Egalitarians base claims to social and political equality on the fact
of universal moral equality” (313). In contrast, Blum seems mainly concerned with social and
political equality, and not necessarily with the moral status that plausibly grounds other types of
equality.
Here again, it would seem that prescriptive stereotypes are more apt to cause harm than
descriptive stereotypes. Consider EEOC and Price Waterhouse once more. In Price Waterhouse,
Ann Hopkins was aware of the negative stereotypes the firm’s partners held and their effects on
her career. Prescriptive stereotypes, which are more likely than descriptive stereotypes to be
consciously endorsed, are apt to be particularly visible to those affected by them. It would take a
rare person indeed not to recognize the dehumanizing effects of blatantly held stereotypes. In
contrast, the harms of descriptive stereotypes may be more hidden; in the Sears case, some
women harmed by the unequal commission system may not initially have even been aware of the
disparate impact of their assignments. Nevertheless, they were being treated unequally; the
failure to recognize harm does not mean one does suffer a wrong. Indeed, as argued in the
previous section, the relative invisibility of the assumptions that guided Sears’ floor assignments
is especially insidious. While no one manager at Sears may have consciously believed that
women were morally inferior to men, the stereotypes that informed women’s assignments
arguably reflect a failure to take women seriously as full moral agents (for example: women are
concerned with frivolous things; women don’t show initiative).
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3.5 Conclusion
I have argued that the primary harm of stereotyping is in its unique role of providing
justification for unjust social systems and thereby dehumanizing members of oppressed groups,
although descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes do so in different ways. Of course, stereotypes
aren’t the only way of justifying such systems. For example, propaganda serves a similar
function (Stanley 2015). But stereotyping, because of its connections to affect and behavior, can
help make it the case that the world continues to be a certain way (a way that continues to appear
to provide justification for stereotypes’ contents). Further work is required to explore how this
justificatory role can be manipulated or eliminated.
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Chapter 4: Relational Responsibility for Implicit Bias
Recently, philosophers have paid a great deal of attention to the question of whether people
are morally responsible for their implicit biases (e.g. Holroyd 2012; Levy 2015; Washington &
Kelly 2016).
My plan is as follows: In Section 4.1, I discuss how I conceptualize ‘implicit bias’ in this
chapter. I also give a brief overview of the relevant philosophical literature on implicit bias and
responsibility. In Section 4.2, I argue that most current accounts of responsibility for implicit
bias take what I call the life hack1 approach, which emphasizes individual control over one’s
cognitive landscape and immediate environment. Section 4.3 develops an objection by
considering cases of perverse hacks: hacks that fulfill all the requirements of the life hack
approach to eliminating ill effects of implicit bias, but nevertheless seem deeply unsatisfying,
perhaps even morally wrong. Section 4.4 considers one response to perverse hacks, namely,
abandoning the life hack approach in favor of structural solutions (advocated by, for example,
Anderson 2012 and Haslanger 2015). Despite its merits, I argue that the structural solutions
approach also fails to adequately address the problem of moral responsibility for implicit bias.
Finally, Section 4.5 draws on the relational autonomy literature to work toward a new account of
responsibility for implicit bias, one that combines the strengths of both the life hack and
structural approaches while avoiding their pitfalls.

4.1 Implicit Cognition and Moral Responsibility
While “implicit attitude” and “implicit bias” are sometimes used interchangeably in the
social psychology literature, for the purposes of this chapter it will be helpful to distinguish these
terms. Attitudes are described by Allport (1935) as the “most distinctive and indispensable
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concept” (quoted in Greenwald et al. 2009, 17) in social psychology. Attitudes are typically
understood as evaluations, either positive or negative, that people form in response to stimuli:
objects, people, events…. Implicit attitudes are a subset of attitudes; they are those attitudes that
are below the level of consciousness, that is, outside conscious awareness or control. Implicit
biases, then, are a subset of implicit attitudes. Strictly speaking, because (by definition) implicit
attitudes are evaluative, we could use “implicit attitude” and “implicit bias” interchangeably. In
practice, though, “implicit bias” is reserved for implicit social attitudes. Recall that Brownstein
& Saul (2016) write: “’Implicit bias’ is a term of art referring to evaluations of social groups that
are largely outside of conscious awareness or control” (1). For the purposes of this chapter, I
adopt their definition.
What of moral responsibility? Philosophers have, in general, come to acknowledge that in
order to hold someone morally responsible for an act, the agent must have had the right kind of
control over that act. But the relevant sense of “control” is much disputed. As Holroyd & Kelly
(2015) point out, one might think that the relevant sense of control is any of the following: direct
control; reflective control originating from a unified agency; evaluative control; or intervention
control. We have direct control over (at least) our immediate actions. Reflective control imposes
a more stringent requirement: I have reflective control over an action when it reflects my
considered evaluative commitments. There is a parallel here to self-disclosure accounts of free
will,6 also commonly referred to as attributability accounts, and defended by Smith (as her
“rational relations” account) and by Scanlon, among others. According to Watson (1996), ”in
virtue of the capacities identified by the self-disclosure view, conduct can be attributable or

6

Although we have been discussing moral responsibility, the literature often elides moral
responsibility and free will (Vargas 2005).
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imputable to an individual as its agent and is open to appraisal that is therefore appraisal of an
individual as an adopter of ends” (229). Free will under self-disclosure or attributability requires
that the agent’s goals and desires line up with her authentic commitments. Where these diverge,
the agent does not act freely and is not responsible.
In a similar vein, I lack evaluative control when my action is the result of a subpersonal
process that cannot be brought into line with my explicit commitments but that operates more or
less independently. Finally, I have intervention control when I am able to “step in” and alter the
course of a process that has already been set in motion, even if that process is below the level of
consciousness.
In the following sections, I examine the reasons philosophers have given for arguing that we
are — or are not — responsible for our implicit biases, and the accounts of control that they
assume. I then go on to argue that philosophers’ focus on our ability or inability to control our
implicit biases has led to a “life hack” approach to combating these biases, an approach that
seriously misses the mark when it comes to thinking about responsibility for implicit bias.

4.1.1 We Are Not Responsible for Our Implicit Biases
According to one school of thought, we are not responsible for our implicit biases. This view
has an intuitive appeal: if I can’t control my implicit biases, how could I possibly be responsible
for them?
Saul (2013), for example, argues that we are not responsible for our implicit biases because
we are not aware of them: “a person should not be blamed for an implicit bias of which they are
completely unaware that results solely from the fact that they live in a sexist culture” (55). The
final clause of this sentence makes it clear that on Saul’s view, it is not the fault of the implicitly
biased individual that she acts in an (implicitly) sexist way; she has simply somehow absorbed
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certain tendencies or habits from her exposure to cultural norms, and this cultural osmosis was
beyond her control. Moreover, once people learn that they probably have implicit biases, “they
do not instantly become able to control their biases, and so they should not be blamed for them”
(55). (Saul does note that people are responsible for taking actions to mitigate their implicit
biases once they become aware of them, which Washington & Kelly [2016] take up; see below.)
Saul seems to assume that -it is- a lack of direct control that relieves us of responsibility for
implicit bias, although her account leaves room for some version of intervention control.
Washington & Kelly (2016) do not argue straightforwardly for or against the claim that we
are responsible for our implicit biases. Rather, they consider the social and epistemic conditions
in which agents count as more or less responsible. Namely, we are not responsible for our
implicit biases insofar as we could not reasonably be expected to be aware of them. For example,
consider a university hiring committee in 1980 that only seriously considers White candidates
because the committee considers their background more prestigious. Stipulate that the committee
has no intention of consciously discriminating against people of color; rather, their implicit
biases conspire to make only the White candidates seem appealing. According to Washington &
Kelly, a committee like this could not reasonably have been expected to have awareness of
implicit bias and its effects. Insofar as they lack this awareness, they lack moral responsibility for
their biased actions.
Now consider a similar hiring committee in 2019 that also produces a shortlist of only White
candidates despite a diverse candidate pool. The 2019 hiring committee does not lack awareness
of implicit bias. Most, if not all, of its members have not just heard about implicit bias, but have
attended bias trainings, read newspaper and magazine articles about implicit bias, had the pitfalls
of implicit bias impressed upon them by their dean, and even heard Hillary Clinton mention
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“implicit bias” in a nationally televised presidential debate. In Washington & Kelly’s terms, the
epistemic milieu in which the 2019 committee exists is relevantly different from the epistemic
milieu of the 1980 committee. This amounts to an externalist condition on responsibility for
implicit bias: granting that the psychological processes of the members of both committees were
quite similar, the 2019 committee is more responsible for its bias insofar as it knew more about
implicit bias. [As Washington & Kelly point out, we attribute responsibility on the basis of folk
theories about belief. If our implicit biases don’t fit neatly into our folk theories of belief, we
should therefore hesitate to blame people for having or acting on such biases]
Levy (2015) argues that we are not responsible for actions caused by our implicit biases
because our implicitly biased behavior is not properly reflective of our beliefs (i.e., lacks
attributability) and not under our control. On Levy’s view, implicit biases are subject to neither
personal control nor subpersonal control. Personal control is direct and fairly straightforward: we
have personal control over our actions (and their consequences) when we freely and deliberately
intend them. It seems clear that we cannot meet this control condition when it comes to our
implicit biases, for even if we are aware that we might have a particular implicit attitude, we
remain unaware of how that attitude “influence[s] our information processing” and unable to “hit
upon a method of modulating or inhibiting this influence” (5). The epistemic conditions for
having personal control are therefore quite stringent.
On the other hand, the requirements for having subpersonal control are less demanding. We
exercise subpersonal control over many everyday actions, e.g., when braking unexpectedly. My
split-second reaction when the car ahead of me suddenly stops is probably unintentional, so I
lack personal control over my decision. But because I intentionally learned how to brake, I have
subpersonal control that makes me responsible for my braking. Crucially, subpersonal control is
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reasons-responsive (Levy relies on Fischer & Ravizza’s 1998 account of guidance control). My
braking is counterfactually sensitive to the context of my relevant surroundings, like my speed
and the distance between my car and the car ahead; if the car had been 500 feet ahead instead of
15, I would not have slammed on the brakes. So, I had a reason to depress the brake pedal (for
the sake of space, and because they are not relevant for my purposes, I will not elaborate on the
further conditions for reasons-responsiveness Levy lays out).
Recall from Chapter 2 that, on Levy’s account of implicit biases, they are “patchy
endorsements”: they have some propositional structure but are not able to be updated by
propositional arguments in the same way beliefs are. Thus, we do not have even subpersonal
control over our implicit biases, because “the relevant mechanisms lack…the appropriate
sensitivity to reasons” (5).
A common thread runs through Saul, Washington & Kelly’s, and Levy’s accounts: we are not
responsible for our implicit biases because (or, per Washington & Kelly, insofar as) we lack the
right sort of control. More precisely, Levy argues that we are not responsible for implicit biases
insofar as we lack control and attributability. Nevertheless, each of the views I survey here takes
control — however that is cashed out — to be a necessary condition for responsibility, whatever
other conditions there might be.

4.1.2 We Are Responsible for Our Implicit Biases
Several philosophers have argued recently that we are in fact responsible for our implicit
biases. In this section, I focus on Brownstein (2016a), Holroyd (2014), Holroyd & Kelly (2016)
as representative examples.
Brownstein (2016a) argues that our implicit biases express what really matters to us, even if
we don’t endorse the content of those biases. He begins from an attributability theory of
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responsibility. On Brownstein’s view, we are responsible for those actions that are attributable to
our “real” or “deep selves,” that is, those actions that reflect upon our deep selves. The
terminology can cause confusion, so it is important to note that an agent’s “deep self” is not
necessarily some core or foundational self, or even a coherent self. Our deep selves may include
attitudes, dispositions, and habits, some of which could contradict each other. As Brownstein
puts it, “the deep self is a functional concept representing an agent’s stable and identitygrounding attitudes” (4).
For example, if I accidentally bump my cart into another shopper at a crowded grocery store,
I am not responsible for the bump just as long as my actions are not reflective of my deep self.
(This doesn’t mean it is not appropriate for me to apologize!) However, if I carelessly push my
cart through the aisles as quickly as possible because I want to check out, and I don’t pay much
attention to who might be in my way, my bumping the shopper does seem reflective of my deep
self and something for which I can be held responsible. This is true even if I never intended to hit
the shopper. I would still be, as Brownstein suggests, “a jerk!” (3).
The upshot of Brownstein’s argument is that, on a deep-self attributability account, we can
count as responsible for our implicit biases when they reflect our deep selves. Recall the shooter
bias task we looked at in Chapter 1. People who have low motivation to act in non-prejudiced
ways, but high motivation to act in ways that appear non-prejudiced to others, tend to
demonstrate more shooter bias. As Brownstein argues, these attitudes and dispositions seem to
reveal something important about the moral character of the person to whom they belong. They
reveal what that person truly cares about.
Because Brownstein emphasizes the importance of an attitude’s belonging to an agent’s deep
self, it might seem control is beside the point. However, he does discuss the importance of
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indirect, long-term control exercised by cultivating habits and dispositions (5). Although we
cannot control our implicit attitudes directly, our deep selves reveal what we care about, and
therefore to some degree seem susceptible to control. If the person described just above truly
cared about acting in a non-prejudiced way (and not just seeming to), she could practice ways to
reduce her prejudice, like thinking “when I see a Black face on the screen, I will think ‘safe’!”,
which leads to less shooter bias. This person may not have exercised direct, conscious control
over the formation of her current attitudes and habits, but the point is that she can have some
degree of control over them. Without the possibility for control, the deep self seems an
unsatisfactory way to assess responsibility. I therefore count Brownstein as among those who
consider control (or the possibility thereof) a necessary condition on responsibility for implicit
bias.
Holroyd (2014), like Washington & Kelly (2016), considers whether we should be aware of
our implicit cognitions and whether a lack of awareness makes us morally culpable. She
distinguishes among three different types of awareness: (1) direct awareness of one’s own
implicit biases (this is the type Saul considers); (2) awareness that one is likely to harbor certain
implicit biases (this is the type Washington & Kelly examine); and (3) awareness of the morally
relevant properties of our implicitly biased behavior. Holroyd examines whether we could be
culpably unaware in the third sense (the culpability condition is important, since lack of
awareness does not in itself necessarily imply a moral failure).
Granted, people are highly motivated not to think of themselves as unfairly prejudicial,
which is supported by a raft of psychological studies (see Holroyd 2014, 521). People also
generally lack awareness of when they act on this motivation. Perhaps this motivation is so
powerful and so removed from conscious awareness that we should not hold people culpable
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when their actions reflect their motivated, biased thinking. But as Holroyd points out, it is not
impossible for agents to recognize that they engage in self-deceptive behaviors, and reminding
study participants of their susceptibility to unconscious biases has led them to admit that their
motivations could be biased (Pronin & Kugler 2007). Therefore, in at least some circumstances,
people may be culpable for behavior resulting from self-deception.
In the Pronin & Kugler studies, participants stopped denying their potential for biased
behavior only after they were reminded of how introspection often fails to fully identify our
motivations. According to Washington & Kelly’s account, roughly, the participants were more
culpable for their biased behavior after having been informed of the unreliability of
introspection. Holroyd argues, though, that people ought to recognize that their behaviors are
biased even if they do not or cannot recognize the motivations that helped produce those
behaviors. To return to the hiring committee analogy, even if we grant that the 1980 committee
was poorly placed to recognize the likelihood of being influenced by implicit biases, Holroyd
would argue that they nevertheless should have recognized the wrongness of their biased
behavior. The committee is not culpably self-deceptive — if they do not know about implicit
biases, they cannot deceive themselves with respect to those biases’ influence — but they are
blameworthy insofar as they do not pay enough attention to their behavior. Like the selfdeceptive, they are culpably imperfect cognizers: in Holroyd’s terms, they are culpably
inattentive. They have not paid enough attention to recognize that their actions are biased. Even
though the committee members are not explicit bigots, they failed to care enough to recognize
that their actions did not reflect their values. Sher and Smith, among others, have argued that
such inattentiveness can be morally blameworthy insofar as it reflects what an agent really cares
about (her evaluative stance).
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So, while Holroyd does not make it a condition for responsibility that people have direct
control over their implicit biases, her account seems to depend on the ability of agents to exercise
some kind of control. She does not specify in her 2014 paper what kind of control that could be
(but see below re: an account of control in Holroyd & Kelly 2016), but her stance that even
inattentive actions can reflect what we really care about is similar to views of control in the free
will literature, especially in attributability accounts. Because Holroyd & Kelly discuss control in
more detail, I conclude this section by turning to their (2016) account.
Holroyd & Kelly (2016) argue that we have the right sort of cognitive and environmental
control to count as responsible for our implicit biases. Recall that philosophers have proposed
that one type of control we can exercise is intervention control; we have intervention control
when we can “step in” to alter a course of action, even if that course of action was set in motion
by some process outside introspective awareness or control. The idea is that we can intervene
indirectly on our cognitive processes, as by repeating mantras like “when I see a Black face on
the screen, I will think ‘safe’!” (cf. the earlier discussion of Brownstein). Holroyd & Kelly
defend a modified version of intervention control — ecological control — which broadens the
typically defined scope of intervention. Holroyd & Kelly propose that we can also manipulate
our surroundings to better achieve our goals. On this account, Holroyd & Kelly argue, implicit
attitudes can count as part of who an agent is, and therefore count as a proper target for aretaic
appraisal.7

7

Compare self-disclosure accounts of free will. These are also commonly referred to as
attributability accounts, defended by Smith 2005 (as her “rational relations” account) and by
Scanlon (2009), among others. According to Watson (1996): “in virtue of the capacities
identified by the self-disclosure view, conduct can be attributable or imputable to an individual
as its agent and is open to appraisal that is therefore appraisal of an individual as an adopter of
ends” (229). Free will under self-disclosure or attributability requires that the agent’s goals and
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Again, note that the common thread running through these accounts is an emphasis on our
potential to control our implicit biases. This control is what makes it possible for us to be held
responsible for our biases (and/or the behavioral consequences of those biases). In other words,
we are responsible for behavior we can reasonably be expected to have control over, whether or
not we exercise that control.

4.2 The “Life Hack” Approach
Now that we have established the literature’s emphasis on control, we can look more closely
at various accounts’ specific recommendations for exercising control so as to minimize the
effects of implicit bias. I will look at several recently published papers and argue that their focus
falls under what we might call a “cognitive hygiene” or “life hack”8 approach. Much like the
20th-century mental hygiene movement that sought to help people “develop their personalities”
to better conform to social standards of mental health and behavior (cf. Cohen 1983), cognitive
hygiene seeks to help refine individuals’ mental states and behaviors to better accord with certain
standards (equality, fairness, justice, etc.).
Recommendations for controlling implicit bias also have much in common with the more
recent movement to “hack” various aspects of one’s life in order to live more efficiently. For
example, a “life hacker” might decide to drink prepackaged nutritional shakes to save time on
meal preparation. The basic idea is to optimize one’s behavior along some value (in this case,
efficiency). Similarly, a “life hack” approach to combating implicit bias focuses efforts on

desires line up with her authentic commitments. Where these diverge, the agent does not act
freely.
8

I believe that Carol Hay used the phrase “life hack” to describe an individualistic approach to
the correction of implicit biases in a session at the September 2016 meeting of the Society for
Analytical Feminism (author’s notes), so I credit her original use of the phrase in this context.
1
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optimizing one’s behavior to reduce biased outcomes. While there may be some
acknowledgement of social structures and their influence on behavior, the point of the
recommended interventions is to change one’s own mental states and behaviors. In what follows,
I will use the phrase “life hack” to emphasize how the recommendations exhort individuals to
exercise control over their own behaviors.
First, consider this passage from Holroyd (2012):

“…before concluding that an individual who is influenced by implicit bias is sexist and
racist, we might say that she has just gone wrong – some aspects of her cognitive and
motivational structures are such that, if she really cares about treating people respectfully
and fairly, she should work to get rid of or limit the influence of”

Likewise:

“…focusing on one’s failures to live up to ideals can activate the goal of treating others
non-prejudicially, thereby inhibiting bias related goals”

Similarly, Holroyd & Kelly (2016) write:

“…individuals can take ecological control of something when they

reflectively

decide to manipulate their mental states or environment, so as to shape their
cognitive processes, thus enabling the exercise of ecological control in the future.”
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One way to take ecological control is to work on one’s own mental states. But another
way, they argue, is to use environmental props to make unbiased behaviors more likely. Thus, the
“hack” does not have to be performed directly on one’s own mental states, although that is one
option. Another way to hack implicit bias is to change aspects of one’s environment to make
unbiased behavior more likely. So “ecological control” encompasses environmental props as well
as cognitive props:

“A person might engineer her ‘external’ epistemic environment in other ways to
ensure that her intentions and values are more fluidly expressed in her actions and
judgments.” [an environmental prop]

Brownstein (2016b) takes a similar approach:

“A contextualist ethics of implicit bias focuses on putting oneself into the right
relationship with one’s context and thereby helping to create the kind of environment
that promotes ethical thought and action” (231)

4.3 A Problem for Life Hackers: Perverse Hacks & Implicit Saints
In this section, I raise a problem for “life hack” accounts that prioritize setting
implementation intentions, setting - use different word - goals, and taking ecological control.
Consider the following scenario: Jamie is White and wants to reduce her implicit bias. She
often reads news stories about the consequences of implicit racial bias and wants to make sure
that any implicit biases of hers don’t unfairly disadvantage minorities. She has taken steps where
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she can, like anonymizing applications to a program she helps administer, but every day seems to
bring a new story about an unintended consequence of unconscious racial bias. What’s the
ultimate “hack” for a conscientious person like Jamie, who wants to reduce or, ideally, eliminate
the unwanted consequences of implicit racial biases?
Recall, for example, Holroyd & Kelly (2016): “A person might engineer her ‘external’
epistemic environment in other ways to ensure that her intentions and values are more fluidly
expressed in her actions and judgments.” As a conscientious person, Jamie very much wants her
actions and judgments to express her intentions and values. Pondering the evidence and
considering her moral duties, Jamie concludes that the most effective way to stop her implicit
biases from harming minorities is to remove herself as much as possible from any scenario in
which her implicit biases could harm a minority. She reasons that she ought to position herself
such that her biases won’t ever come into play.
Jamie hears about a community of people just like her. This community is explicitly antiracist. It’s made up entirely of White people who have chosen to live there precisely because they
are very concerned about how their implicit biases are liable to affect people of color. Taxes are
high and fund reparations. Book clubs discuss classics like Invisible Man and Sister Outsider.
But, the residents reason, it would be ethically wrong of them to actually interact with people of
color. They know not just about implicit bias, but about theories of microaggressions, stereotype
threat, and so on. No matter how much they educate themselves about oppression, they agree that
they simply cannot understand the experiences of people of color. Moreover, as White people
who were raised in a racist society, they cannot avoid harming people of color as a result of their
implicit biases, no matter how conscientious they are. The best solution, they agree, is to
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unburden people of color by removing themselves socially, as one would quarantine a disease.
Call this the community of implicit saints. Jamie decides to join the implicit saints.
This approach seems to be the ultimate “life hack”: it fulfills the obligation to order oneself
and one’s environment so as to cause the minimum amount of harm due to implicit bias. But
there is something that strikes most of us as deeply wrong about this “solution.” For one thing, it
looks very much like a White supremacist vision of an ideal society. While some White
supremacists are content to live among people of color as long as people of color are a second
class, a popular strain of White supremacy calls for separatism, spreading slogans like “diversity
= White genocide” on Twitter (cf. Greene 2019).
The “implicit saint” example might also seem unrealistic. However, someone like Jamie
might well try to avoid at least some interactions and conversations with people of color out of a
fear of causing unintentional distress. There is also historical precedent for attempts to create
segregated societies under the stated belief9 that Black people would be better off being
physically removed from oppression by White people. The American Colonization Society,
formed in 1816, supported the migration of free African Americans to Africa and established a
colony on the Pepper Coast (modern Liberia). The Society comprised evangelicals and Quakers
— including James Madison, its first president — who believed Black Americans would face
better chances for freedom in Africa than in the United States.
Moreover, the community of implicit saints is presented as a thought experiment. If we
accept that we can (and should) work on life hacks like implementation intentions and ecological
control, with the goal of improving our individual cognitive hygiene and decreasing the chances

The stated belief because anti-Black racism surely played a role in 19th-century attempts to
physically remove (already free) Black Americans rather than challenge the ideological
foundations of slavery and White supremacy.
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that our implicit biases will cause harm to others, then the community of implicit saints appears
to be a fine way to work toward that goal. Yet Jamie seems to do something wrong by deciding
to join the community.

4.4 A Possible Solution to Perverse Hacks: The Structural View
One strategy for dealing with the “implicit saint” problem is to argue that the “life hack”
approach that leads to the problem is fundamentally misguided. Instead of placing the burden on
individuals to change their environments or habits, we should recognize the systemic or
structural framework in which implicit biases exist.
The structural view points out that implicit biases are dependent on our social and cultural
environment. For example, groups who are targets of implicit bias tend to be just as implicitly
biased against themselves as any other group, e.g., Black Americans tend to score similarly to
White Americans on tests of implicit bias - citation. It is difficult to understand this finding if we
persist in thinking of implicit biases primarily as cognitive structures belonging to the individual.
But if we think of bias as structural — as like the air we all breathe, as some writers put it —
then we can begin to make more sense of the phenomenon.
If implicit biases depend on our environments, the structural view asserts, then attempting
(and even succeeding) to change our own cognitions and immediate contexts won’t get us very
far. Rather, we should focus on changing social structures themselves. Then, we can get rid of
implicit biases for free.
Consider Anderson (2012), who adopts a structural framework to respond to Fricker (2007)
on epistemic injustice. On Fricker’s view, epistemic injustice occurs when someone is discounted
as an epistemic agent because of bias against a social identity of theirs. The experiences of
Marge Sherwood in the film version of Patricia Highsmith’s novel The Talented Mr. Ripley
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provide one example. Marge confronts her former fiancé Dickie’s father, Herbert Greenleaf, with
her suspicion that Tom Ripley has killed Dickie and stolen his identity. But Herbert refuses to
believe Marge, discounting her testimony because she is a woman: “Marge, there’s female
intuition, and then there are facts.” Fricker comments, “It is easy to see that Greenleaf’s silencing
of Marge here involves an exercise of power, and of gender power in particular” (9). Fricker
recommends testimonial justice, which involves a practice of recognizing and guarding against
biases one might have, to counter the problem of epistemic injustice. -he’s literally incapable
As Anderson notes, Fricker’s solution depends on individuals’ efforts to correct their own
biases. But, Anderson argues, sometimes the causes of epistemic injustice are structural in nature
and require structural solutions. That is, even if individuals manage to cut off their own biases at
the stem, and are not personally responsible for any instances of epistemic injustice, structural
forces might cause some individuals to suffer epistemic injustice, and individuals focusing on
themselves will not alter those forces. Indeed, even certain structural solutions are not enough,
although they are important and can enhance individuals’ efforts (like company guidelines for
hiring and firing, which help individuals act in less biased ways).
However, epistemic injustices can occur even in the absence of individual bias. As Fricker
herself notes, we often take people more or less seriously based on “credibility markers” they
display, like educational credentials. Of course we should grant more credibility to an
epidemiologist than to a lay person who erroneously claims that “studies have shown” that
vaccines cause autism. Anderson points out, though, that members of certain groups are
systematically denied access to opportunities to gain credibility markers. When these individuals’
testimony is discounted because of, say, their lack of education, they suffer epistemic injustice,
even though those hearing the testimony may be justified in discounting it.
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Anderson therefore recommends a shift in focus when it comes to correcting these injustices.
She makes an analogy with charity: it would be better to restructure institutions so that poverty is
no more rather than ask individuals to donate money to “fix” poverty. This does not mean that
people should be discouraged from donating to charity, just as people should not be discouraged
from taking steps to correct for their own biases (and in fact should be encouraged to do so). The
point is just that the problem requires a broader scope of solutions, for example, the continued
integration of educational institutions so that members of all groups have equal opportunity to
acquire the markers of credibility.
Haslanger (2015) argues in a similar vein that changing individual attitudes will have limited
effectiveness in counteracting bias, and moreover, focusing on implicit bias leads us to ignore the
real moral stakes of inequality. For example, a White teacher who strictly enforces a classroom
policy on speaking out of turn might alienate students of color when she sends a Black student to
the principal’s office, even though she has dismissed White students for the same infraction and
did not act out of implicit bias. Nevertheless, the students’ previous experiences make it
reasonable for them to doubt their teacher’s fairness. It does not seem that anyone acted wrongly
due to bias. So Haslanger concludes that “the source of the problem is cultural, not individual”
(7).
Haslanger does not altogether dismiss implicit bias as a factor in perpetuating inequality, but
she argues that its explanatory role is smaller than often assumed in the philosophical and
psychological literatures. Accordingly, it is misguided to focus one’s efforts primarily on rooting
out or correcting for one’s own implicit biases. Rather, what is morally required (and ultimately
more effective) is to organize with others to agitate for broader social change. Counteracting
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one’s implicit biases may be a “minimum [moral] requirement,” but we must work collectively
in order to get at the root of the problem.
Anderson and Haslanger set aside a place for “life hack” approaches to implicit bias, even as
they urge a more comprehensive view of systems that sustain discrimination. Others go even
further, dismissing implicit bias as a red herring. For example, Banks & Ford (2011) argue that it
is “fanciful” to think that personal prejudice plays any major role in discrimination. Given that
institutional phenomena like redlining continue to severely disadvantage minority groups, even
in the absence of individuals’ biases, the structural view is persuasive. Even if we somehow
wiped the slate of our implicit biases clean, institutional practices would march on, causing
discrimination in the absence of anyone’s explicit or implicit biases.
Even the more moderate structural views endorsed by Anderson and Haslanger, though, have
problems addressing the implicit saint example. First, it is overly pessimistic about individual
change. Both Haslanger and Anderson point to limitations in studies of implicit bias change.
There is very little evidence to suggest that implicit biases can be changed in the long term.
However, two points are important here. First, longer-term change has, for the most part, simply
not been studied. It is therefore difficult to draw conclusions about the possibility of changed
attitudes weeks, months, and years after the intervention. Second, the interventions currently
studied are fairly simple ones, like the repetition of a phrase. This makes sense at the current
juncture, since psychologists want to control for variables. But again, it is possible that more
complex interventions, more integrated into participants’ daily lives and repeated over longer
time periods, would prove more effective in the short or long term. Moreover, we do have
evidence for the relative effectiveness of some interventions over others.
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Second, the structural approach seems to ignore cases of genuine responsibility. For example,
St. Louis has a well documented history of institutional bias toward Black citizens; the “Delmar
Divide” refers to the result of decades of redlining, so that a majority White neighborhood to the
south of Delmar Boulevard boasts house values several times higher than those north of Delmar,
in neighborhoods just a few blocks away but home mostly to Black residents, higher crime, and
less developed infrastructure (Tighe & Ganning 2015).
Clearly, there are real structural problems in St. Louis, but I think we can still appropriately
blame certain individuals for implicit biases. Someone directing the office of public transit can
make structural changes to better serve neglected neighborhoods, but they should probably also
make sure that, for example, they look at resumes in a fair way. Haslanger does acknowledge
that attending to potential implicit biases may be a minimum moral requirement, but she
considers “fixing” individual implicit biases incidental to the real problem. Likewise, Anderson
believes that we should be encouraged to attend to our implicit biases, but that structural
solutions are necessary for structural problems. However, being aware of and compensating for
implicit biases doesn’t always seem beside the point. Indeed, awareness of implicit bias may
ultimately get us closer to the goal of structural transformation. In the public transit case, the
office director plausibly has a better chance of moving toward structural transformation if she
thinks and cares about implicit bias. Understanding her probable implicit biases can make her
likelier, for example, to hire people from underserved neighborhoods, who can help guide transit
policy in a more (systematically) equitable way.

4.5 Relational Autonomy: A Better Model for Responsibility
In this section, I present an account of responsibility for implicit bias that borrows from
work on relational autonomy. Relational autonomy has its roots in feminist philosophy,
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particularly in MacKenzie & Stoljar (2000). I argue that relational autonomy presents a
framework for thinking about responsibility that accommodates the insights of the “life hack”
approach and the structural approach, while avoiding the drawbacks of each.
Feminist theorists introduced relational autonomy in response to traditional models, which
emphasized reliance on the self in isolation from others. On the traditional model of autonomy,
an autonomous agent is one who has the capability to endorse or reject lower-level attitudes.
What is important for autonomy, on this view, is one’s relationship to one’s own attitudes. For
example, Bratman (2009) argues that a “self-governing policy” based on higher-order attitudes is
required for autonomy.
Relational autonomy theorists point out that the traditional model describes autonomy as
something that one can possess and exercise in isolation. If what is important for autonomy is my
relationship to my attitudes, then others’ attitudes about either my attitudes or my actions are
irrelevant when it comes to whether I am autonomous. On relational autonomy, though,
relationships with others are necessary in order for me to count as an autonomous agent. What is
required for my autonomy is not a kind of relationship I have to my own attitudes, but rather,
how I am disposed to respond to other agents who might call me to account for my commitments
and actions.
Note that the kinds of relational theories I am discussing give accounts of autonomy and not
responsibility per se. Autonomy and responsibility are not necessarily co-occurring. In most
cases, we think of someone who is autonomous as someone who is also responsible for their
actions, and of someone who can be held responsible as autonomous. However, feminist
theorists in particular have argued that we ought not conflate autonomy and responsibility. For
example, Oshana (2002) writes of the “misguided marriage” between autonomy and
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responsibility. Oshana argues that while responsibility depends on a “thick,” normative concept
of rationality, autonomy requires only a “thin,” instrumental concept of rationality. I will not
rehearse her argument here, but simply note that from an account of autonomy, we do not
necessarily get an account of responsibility. Therefore, we need to do some work to arrive at an
account of relational responsibility.
What might such an account look like? It is beyond the scope of this chapter to develop and
defend a full account of relational responsibility, but I will examine a candidate for such an
account. In diagnosing where it succeeds and where it fails, I present some desiderata for an
account of relational responsibility.
One option is suggested by O’Connor (2002), who draws on Wittgenstein to argue that
Whites are a family resemblance group, and on Iris Marion Young to argue that serial identity is
the basis for the family resemblance. Whites have a serial identity “relative to a background of
racist practices” (127). White identity does not depend on any one property or attribute. Rather,
O’Connor likens it to a thread spun by twisting many fibers together, which overlap and bind
each other together. Some of the individual fibers include “light skin color and other physical
attributes, family membership, benefits enjoyed in a system of privilege, social history, societal
expectations, socioeconomic status, career options, speech patterns, music, [and] segregation”
(128). Drawing on Charles Mills’ (2014) work on the Racial Contract, O’Connor argues that
consenting to the racial system entails being responsible for the system. O’Connor admits that
“consent” here is not straightforward; for example, when it comes to the Racial Contract,
someone may count as consenting to the benefits it bestows without consciously intending to do
so. In this case, the beneficiary is culpably ignorant, as Mills argues: the beneficiary chooses not
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to question, for example, the popular wisdom that racism used to be a “real problem” but that
nowadays people are too sensitive and perceive racism where it doesn't exist, etc.
This analysis is attractive insofar as it provides resources for how to think about
responsibility for bias where those who benefit did not create the system of bias and may not
explicitly endorse the system (and may even disavow parts of the system). However, the family
resemblance account of responsibility does not seem adequate when it comes to implicit bias.
First, on the family resemblance account, responsibility derives from consent. But someone who
does not consent to, and does not benefit from, implicit bias can nevertheless perpetuate it. In
fact, one of the remarkable findings about implicit bias is that someone who is disadvantaged can
nevertheless act from bias against their own group. So, it seems that the family resemblance
account cannot give us the full story about responsibility for implicit bias (assuming that those
who act according to implicit bias against their own group are at least somewhat responsible for
it — see below for more).
Second, the family resemblance account of identity concerns mainly my relationships with
other in-group members, and its account of responsibility depends on one’s consent to the biased
system. But it seems one could evade responsibility for the system by revoking one’s consent —
by, e.g., joining the community of implicit saints. Again, though, this action would seem to miss
the point about one’s moral responsibilities to others, and we are back where we started.
I propose that on a relational responsibility account, I have control over responding to — or
over my dispositions to respond to — justificatory demands from others. Note that the others
here could be actual or potential.
Recall that on the “life hack” approach, my responsibility is derived from the control I have
over my own cognitive landscape and immediate environment. On the structural approach,
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individual agential control misses the point: we ought to focus our efforts on oppressive social
institutions.
Relational responsibility, understood in terms of dispositions to respond to justificatory
demands from actual or potential others, has advantages over both the life hack and structural
approaches. First, because the others who place justificatory demands can be actual or potential,
we are able to diagnose where the implicit saint goes wrong. The implicit saint is unwilling to
develop justifications for her actions to her potential interlocutors; she has simply left them
behind. Understanding responsibility for implicit bias from a relational point of view
appropriately expands our moral gaze from our individual cognitions and immediate
environment. Relational responsibility asks: what can we learn from others? At the same time, a
relational approach has advantages over a structural approach, insofar as relational responsibility
holds open the possibility for individuals to effect important change by attending — although not
exclusively — to ways they can limit the effects of their own implicit biases.
Finally, I will briefly consider some possible objections to relational responsibility. First, one
might argue that implicit biases depend on stereotypes, which generally reflect reality more or
less accurately. If so, perhaps I have no obligation to develop justifications for my implicit
biases. That stereotypes are accurate is not a fringe position (at least, depending on the content of
the stereotype). Jussim argues that stereotypes tend to reflect reality. This is a version of the
“grain of truth” argument: there is something true about most stereotypes, no matter how
exaggerated. For example, Jussim argues that people’s judgments of groups tend to be mostly
accurate (see, e.g., Jussim 2017). However, it should give us pause that stereotypes are liable to
change drastically over short periods of time. For example, in the 1940s, women were
stereotyped as particularly skilled programmers; Dr. Grace Hopper told an interviewer, “It’s just
89

like planning a dinner. You have to plan ahead and schedule everything so it’s ready when you
need it. Programming requires patience and the ability to handle detail. Women are ‘naturals’ at
computer programming.” Compare this stereotype to today’s stereotypes about programmers,
who are usually stereotyped as male rather than female, skilled at math rather than blessed with
patience, and so forth. If stereotypes can transform so much over the course of a generation or so,
then I might be asked to justify why I hold one stereotype about a group rather than another.
Even if we accept stereotype accuracy, though, Jussim acknowledges that individuating
information is more predictive than stereotypes (2017, 17). That is, even if stereotypes reflect
reality (whether that is meant as a generic claim or a statistical claim), that fact would not
necessarily license relying on those stereotypes when dealing with individuals, especially if we
are unaware in the moment of our use of those stereotypes, as seems to be the case for implicit
bias.
One might also argue that relational responsibility is too demanding to members of
disadvantaged or oppressed groups. After all, most people tend to have implicit biases in favor of
dominant groups, no matter their personal group memberships. Therefore, other group members
— and even outgroup members! — might call them to account for their implicit biases. But this
might seem too demanding; why should a disadvantaged person be responsible for trying to fix
biases that ultimately harm her? In other words, shouldn't the onus be on members of the
dominant group? As Audre Lorde writes, “Black and Third World people are expected to educate
White people as to our humanity. Women are expected to educate men…. The oppressors
maintain their position and evade responsibility for their own actions. There is a constant drain of
energy which might be better used in redefining ourselves and devising realistic scenarios for
altering the present and constructing the future” (1984, 115).
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On the relational responsibility account, the member of the oppressed group can indeed be
called to account for their implicit biases and biased actions. However, this responsibility might
be mitigated. Further, if we take epistemic privilege seriously, oppressed group members have
the best knowledge of the ways in which implicit biases disadvantage them. This is certainly not
to say, though, that every member of an oppressed group always has a responsibility to educate
dominant group members, or to devote their lives to “fixing” implicit bias, etc.

4.6 Conclusion
I have argued that most current accounts of responsibility for implicit bias take what I have
called a “life hack” approach, on which individuals are responsible for attending to and
modifying their attitudes and environments so as to reduce the harms associated with implicit
biases. The life hack approach falls prey to a counterexample: the implicit saint who purifies her
cognitions and surroundings so thoroughly that she removes herself from the people whom she
might harm with her implicit biases. Although the insights of structural theorists can be used to
construct a response to the implicit saint, I have argued that a structural approach is also
inadequate: it is too pessimistic about the possibility of individual change, and it fails to
accommodate cases of genuine responsibility.
In response, I propose an account of relational responsibility modeled on the insights of
relational autonomy. Specifically, I argue that we are responsible for our implicit biases insofar
as we have control over responding to, or over our dispositions to respond to, justificatory
demands from others regarding the content of those biases. While more work needs to be done to
develop a full account of relational responsibility, I have argued that it is a more promising
approach than either the life hack approach or the structural approach.
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